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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY  
 
1.1.1 Introduction 
 
The Central African Monetary and Economic Community, known by its French acronym 
CEMAC (Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale), is one of the oldest 
regional economic blocs in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states. Its 
membership comprises of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.  It has a population of over 32 million inhabitants in a 
three million (3 million) square kilometre expanse of land.
1
 The changes in the world economy, 
and especially between the ACP countries, on the one hand, and the European Economic 
Community-EEC (hereinafter referred to as European Union (EU)), on the other hand,
2
 did not 
leave the CEMAC region unaffected. CEMAC region, like any other regional economic blocs in 
Africa was faced with the need to readjust in the face of a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO).
3
 The region which had benefited from preferential access to the EU market including 
financial assistance through the European Development Fund (EDF) had to comply with the 
rules laid down in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This eventually led to a shift in the EU 
trade policy, in order to ensure that its trade preferences to developing countries were compatible 
to the rules and obligations of the WTO.
4
  
This chapter discusses the trend of events that have contributed in shaping the trade relationship 
between the EU and CEMAC in the past 40 years. These events are both de jure and de facto in 
character and implications for the two regions. De jure, means those incidents of law and de 
facto, factual circumstances which cannot be undermined, or avoided. The chapter is divided into 
                                                             
1Zafar, A & Kubota A, (2003). Regional Integration in Central Africa Region,  Working Paper Series No. 52 June 
2003 
2 Bartels L, (2007). The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union  
3 Muni, S D, (1976) Major Developments in India's Foreign Policy and Relations, July-December 1975 
Muni International Studies. 15: 393-417. 
4 GATT Article I and GATT Article XXIV 
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two sections; the first part gives an introduction to the thesis, and the development of the 
problem. The second part focuses on the research framework, which includes: the research 
statement, research question, the methodology, hypothesis, research objectives, an outline of the 
chapters and conclusion. 
 
1.1.2 Historical Development 
 
The EU had existed under the banner of the EEC since its creation in 1957 at the Treaty of 
Rome. The historical development of the economic and political co-operation between CEMAC 
and the EU could be best understood if traced in part, from the creation of French Equatorial 
Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Francaise – AEF) in 1901, and the treaty of Rome 1957, on the 
other. The first part of this history dealt with the formation of the Custom and Economic Union 
of Central Africa (Union Douniere Economique de la Afrique Central (UDEAC)). This will be 
discussed under the institutional framework for CEMAC.
5
 
 However, it will be best to begin with events that led to the association of EU and African states. 
According to Kiplagate P.K, the intention of including the “African Associates” (Association of 
African States and Madagascar -AASM) in the agenda of the Treaty of Rome was based on the 
premise that colonialist rule will continue. Unfortunately for Europe, this strategy was ruptured 
by the wave of independence that swept across Africa from 1957 to the 1970s.
6
 These states 
were associated to the European Six (France, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and 
West Germany) by virtue of their colonial relationships.
7
 France, Italy, and Belgium in 
particular, expressed solidarity to their overseas colonies, or territories, towards economic 
growth and development, by ensuring that the economies and political needs of these countries, 
were given significant considerations, during the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome.
8
 The 
securing of the “interest” of the AASMs during the negations was a prerequisite for France to 
                                                             
5 See Chapter two.  
6 Kiplagat, P. K, (1993). The Fortress Europe and Africa Under the Lome Convention: From Policy of Paralysis to a 
Dynamic Response. HeinOnline—18N.C.J. Inter’l L.& com. Reg.594 
7 Isebill V. G, (1976). The Lomé Convention: Inching Towards Interdependence. International Organization, Vol. 
30, No.2 (Spring, 1976), pp. 241-262 
8 Bach, D.C, (1999) p.125. Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Disintegration.  
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join the EU.
9
 As a consequence of the Treaty of Rome, a commercial and financial association 
was established between the European Six and the “Associated States”.10 The treaty also 
established a Free Trade Area (FTA) between the AASMs on preferential basis. The AASMs‟ 
exports were given preferential access to the EU market. 
 By the end of 1970, most of the Associated States had become independent. The period between 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the Yaoundé Conventions was characterised by a wave of 
independence that swept through the African continent, leading to political and economic 
independence from former colonial powers in Europe and the Americas.
11
 However, faced with 
the reality of the smallness of their economies, a request was made for the continuation of 
preferences and aid that had existed under the Treaty of Rome. Indeed the AASMs were able to 
request for a continuation of preferences and aid under Article 131 of the Treaty of Rome.
12
 
The changes in Europe‟s political and economic history at the time, especially the securing of 
markets abroad for raw material and manufactured goods, prompted the signing of the two 
Yaoundé Convents and later the Lomé Conventions.
13
 The convention of associated states and 
the EU were renewed every five years. The first five year convention between the EU and the 
AASMs took place from 1958 to 1962.
14
 
 
                                                             
9 “It is generally agreed that the issue for France was not merely trade preferences, but its desire to distribute the 
burden of overseas aid among the six European Community members.” 
10Enzo R. Grilli, (1996), P.20. The European Community and the Developing Countries. 3rd Ed, Cambridge 
University Press. These were the former French overseas associated to France by virtue of their colonial linkages. 
Article 131-136 of the Treaty of Rome granted associated status to former European colonies in Africa and 
Madagascar. They were called the Association of Africa States and Madagascar (AASM) 
11 Kiplagat P. K, op cit 597 
12Ibid 
13 The first Yaoundé Convention was signed in 1964 and ended in 1969. The second Yaoundé Convention lasted 
from 1971 to 1975. 
14 Isebill V. G, op cit 242 
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1.1.3 The Yaoundé I & II Conventions 
 
The Yaoundé I Convention was the second of five year trade negotiation between the EU and the 
AASMs. Though seen as the second convention, it was actually the first convention between the 
parties, since the AASMs were not present during the first convention at the Treaty of Rome. 
The Yaoundé Convention has been acclaimed as a major breakthrough that brought the AASMs 
to negotiate on equal basis with the European Six.
15
 By virtue of their political and economic 
independence and the necessity for the continuity of trade and aid under the Treaty of Rome, the  
18 African Associates began to negotiate for stronger economic ties with their European Six 
counter parts.
16
  This led to the birth of the first Yaoundé Convention in 1963, which came into 
force in 1964, due to delays in the ratification process.  
The Yaoundé Convention, unlike the Convention of Association under the Treaty of Rome, was 
the first independent negotiation of the AASMs after their independence from colonial rule. 
Though it is argued that the Yaoundé Convention was not a bilateral negotiation but a 
continuation of Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, other schools of thoughts believed that it was a 
great step towards self-determination.
17
 The Yaoundé I Convention basically dealt with trade, 
technical and financial assistance, rights of establishment and institutions.
18
 It guaranteed the 
preferences under the Treaty of Rome, but with a condition on the AASM to grant better access 
to EU products than they do for other countries.
19
  
The Yaoundé I Convention was based on the principle of association, stated in Article 132 of the 
Treaty of Rome, to the effect that the “Associated countries and territories would apply to the EU 
and to each other the same treatment as had been accorded to the „European State with which it 
had special relations.‟”20 In addition, “[the] EEC six would apply to their trade with Associate 
                                                             
15 Ibid 
16 The 18 Associates were Burundi,  Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Leopoldville), Congo 
(Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Somalia and Togo, as cited in  Kiplagate op cit 598. 
17 Montana Ishmael M (2003) 
18 Enzo R. Grilli op cit 21 
19It worth noting that preferences were surposed to be granted on an unconditional manner. The granting of 
preferences to the AASMs on condition of market access was a violation of the Most Favored Nation Clause as will 
be seen in chapter three. 
20Ibid 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
states and territories the same treatment that they accord each other under the Treaty of Rome. 
All members of EEC would contribute to aid required by the associated states and territories. 
Provision was made in the Treaty for the eventual establishment of a Development Fund.” Thus, 
the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle and reciprocity emerged as the AASM negotiated 
trade on bilateral terms with the EU.
21
  
On the 29
th
 of July 1969, a second Yaoundé Convention was held which did not change much 
from the former, but added a development fund, the European Development Fund (EDF). The 
fund granted an aid package worth “918 million for the period 1970 to 1974 compared with $730 
million in 1964-69. Of the $918 million, $748 million constituted grant money; the rest was 
loans and share holdings.”22 
 Trade preferences continued as the AASMs‟ access to the EU market was maintained. However, 
these preferences were based on the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle under General 
Agreement Tariff and Trade (GATT) 1947. Thus, albeit the AASMs did not participate at the 
negation of the GATT in 1947, like other Third World countries, they were subsequently 
engulfed in the practice of its rules. The preferences granted the AASMs were enshrined under 
the principle of non-discrimination of GATT Article 1.  
The EU relationship and trade preferences to the AASMs sparked criticisms from other African 
countries.
23
  At the same time, attempts by Great Britain to integrate the EU were vetoed by the 
French. This to an extent left the members of the Commonwealth Africa, in a position of 
uncertainty of their trade with the EU. These fears caused Nigeria to sign an independent trade 
agreement with the EU in 1966, albeit it never came to existence because it was opposed by the 
French who were against the civil war in Nigeria.
24
  
The EU also signed a trade agreement with the East African States (Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda), in 1969, known as the Arusha Agreement. This agreement contained reciprocal rights 
                                                             
21 Article 132 of the Treaty of Rome. 
22 Isebill. V. G, op cit 246-247 
23 During the very time of the negotiations culminating in the first Yaoundé Convention, a number of continental 
African issues were being debated. African unity on a continental scale was being called for by a number of African 
leaders. President Nkrumah of Ghana accused the EU of running interference with African unity. Nkrumah called 
the EEC "a new system of collective colonialism which will be stronger and more dangerous than the old evils we 
are striving to liquidate. 
24 Isebill. V. G, op cit 246-247 
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in the trade between the parties and ran concurrently with the Yaoundé II Convention but, it did 
not include financial assistance from the EU as was the case with the Yaoundé conventions.
25
 
Isebill. V.G, states that the Yaoundé Conventions did not require the AASMs to grant tariff 
preferences to the EU members. One of the reasons advanced was that the common agricultural 
policy of the EU had exempted some of the products from the AASMs that could have competed 
with EU products. Thus to balance the trade of the 18 FTAs, AASMs were to impose custom 
duties on EU products entering their markets.
26
 It is interesting to note that the AASMs did not 
constitute a FTA though they were not precluded from doing so. The following chapters will 
show how this is going to impact on the trade of CEMAC members because the same 
phenomenon continued where trade between African regional blocs has remained very low since 
independence. 
By 1973, membership in the EU grew from six to nine while the AASMs, Nigeria, the members 
of the Arusha Agreement and the Caribbean nations regrouped to form the African Caribbean 
and the Pacific states-ACP, including other sub-Saharan African nations. There were 46 ACP 
states that negotiated trade with the EU in Brussels in 1973 and concluded after 18 months of 
negotiations in Lomé, Togo, on February 28, 1975.
27
 This led to the birth of the first Lomé 
Convention in 1975. The Lomé agreements and their trade options, form the premise on which 
this work is based.  
                                                             
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid 
27 Ibid 
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
 
1.2.1 The Lomé Conventions 
 
The ACP countries established a special relationship with the EU through successive 
agreements, under the Lomé Conventions.
28
 The first Lomé Convention was signed in 1975, 
widening the scope of the Yaoundé I and II Conventions.
29
 Since 1975, the Lomé I to IV 
Agreements outlined the economic and political relationship between the ACP and the EU, 
culminating to the Cotonou Agreement (CA) of 2000.
30
 The CA, sought the establishment of 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) as an alternative to the Lomé preferences to ACP.
31
 It 
included 77 developing countries (DCs), among which were Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs).
32
 
The Lomé I Convention provided for free access to the EU market without reciprocity, which 
was a great achievement by a unified ACP negotiation against the notion of “reverse preference”.  
The EU option of “reverse preference” meant that, in response to free access to EU‟s market, the 
ACP countries were to allow EU products to enter ACP states tariff free.
33
 “Reverse preference” 
was a reciprocal system of trade between the EU and the AASMs. However, under the new trade 
arrangements involving non-AASMs, members, or ACP states negotiated trade with the EU on a 
non-reciprocal bases. 
 Isebill. V. G argued that, there existed a dissymmetry between the EU and the ACP to warrant 
trade on reciprocal basis. In addition, “reveres preference” was going to prevent ACP states from 
                                                             
28 Bjornskov C & Krivonos E (2001), From Lome to Cotonou: The New EU-ACP Agreement. 
29 Membership of the United Kingdom to the then EEC in 1973 led to the signing of the wider reaching Lomé I 
agreement between 46 ACP and the then 9 EEC member states (1975-80). Yaoundé I and II was based on free trade 
with the EEC and its associate states, the Lomé Convention introduced a trade régime that was characterized by 
granting preferential access to the majority of ACP states‟ exports on a nonreciprocal basis, thus paving the way for 
a new stage of privileged relations with the EEC. European Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4, July 2004, pp. 439–462. 
30 The Cotonou Treaty of 2000 concluded the first phase of an ongoing negotiating process that  shifted trade 
between the EU and some ACP countries away from non-reciprocal, preferential trade to eventual free trade 
agreements (FTAs) 
31<http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonou/lomegen/lomeitoiv_en.cfm#0> [Accessed on 25 June 
2009] 
32  www.dfld.gove.uk>>[Accessed on 10 March 2009] 
33 Isebill.V. G, op cit 255.The notion of reveres preference was an intention of a continuation of Yaoundé 
agreements which were based on reciprocity. 
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buying from less expensive markets. The EU‟s acceptance of this agreement instituted the 
principle of non-reciprocity in the trade between the EU and the ACP. As a consequence, ACP 
products entered the EU market duty free, quotas free and without any requirement to 
reciprocate. However, a separate protocol on certain products was granted preferential access 
because they competed with like products in the EU market. Sugar was traded under a separate 
protocol. Nevertheless, 99.2% of ACP products entered the EU market duty free. Only a few 
products such as sugar, beef and veal were restricted on quantitative basis.
34
 
It also provided for a stabilization fund (Stabilisation of Export Earnings-STABEX) to 
compensate the ACP states   in the event of a fall in price in the world market, financial aid 
under the European Development Fund (EDF) and a possibility to access loans under the 
European Investment Bank (EIB).
35
   
The Lomé II (1980 to 1985) and Lomé III (1985 to 1990) continued the trade regime under the 
Lomé I Convention. While Lomé II added the protocol on the Stabilisation of Export Earning 
from Mining Products (SYSMIN), provided a special quantity and price for rum and a 
guaranteed quota for beef and veal; the Lomé III Convention took a rather pragmatic approach, 
with emphases placed on self-reliance, regional trade cooperation, human rights and 
agriculture.
36
  
The Lomé IV Convention was negotiated with a lot of mixed feelings both by the ACP and the 
EU. The EU went into the negation with a protectionist approach which left the ACP states in 
doubt as to the position of the EU. Despite all the restrictive characteristics of the Agreement, the 
outcome was an “Old wine in new wine skin”.37 The Agreement continued the provisions of the 
Lome III Convention, maintaining all the protocols on agriculture, increased annual quantity, and 
eliminating export tax on ACP products. While tariff quotas on rum was gradually eliminated, 
the banana protocol was maintained and given an even longer period from five to ten years 
duration. Preferences to ACP products entering the EU market were strengthened. The Rule of 
Origin (RoO) provision was relaxed by lowering the local content from sixty percent to forty-
five percent. This made it easier for ACP products to enter the EU duty free without the usual 
                                                             
34 Ibid 
35 Isebill.V. G, op cit 247 
36 Roby, J. L. (1990) 
37 Ibid 
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restriction on RoO. In addition, the STABEX fund was increased and made into a full grant with 
no requirement for replenishment by ACP states.
38
 Generally, the Lomé Agreements were based 
on the principle of non-reciprocity and financial assistance which were totally inconsistent with 
WTO rule. 
The development and the changes that have occurred in the ACP EU trade as a result of the 
principle of non-reciprocity will be seen in subsequent discussion on the issue. The members of 
the CEMAC are also ACP members and signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), as a result of their colonial history.
39
 Thus, whatever negotiations and the   
consequences thereafter, with respect to the multilateral trade agreement under the WTO, have 
had a direct and indirect effect on CEMAC states.  These DCs and LDCs that had become 
members of GATT
40
were subjected to the rules
41
 laid down in World Trade Organisation 
(WTO),
42
 which explicitly incorporate GATT 1947 and 1994. The one of the objectives of 
GATT was the liberalization world trade through various trade instruments including the 
principle of non-discrimination. 
 
1.2.2 The Principle of Non-discrimination  
 
The most fundamental principle of GATT 1947 is the non-discrimination principles, composed 
of the Most Favoured Nation principle (MFN) and the National Treatment principle as stated in 
GATT Article I and Article III respectively.
43
 These principles govern international economic 
transactions for developed and developing countries. They were established to prevent countries 
from discriminating or establishing a system of protectionism against other trading partners.
44
 
It stated that a member of GATT was precluded from discriminating against other trading 
                                                             
38 Ibid 
39 Beverly  M. Carl Trade and the Developing World in the 21st Century (2001) p.301-302 
40 Op cit, p. 301-302 
41 Ibid  
42 See Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994 at www.wto.org>[Accessed on 8 November 2010] 
43 Beverly  M. Carl (2001) p. 75-76  
44 Ibid 
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partners, by lowering tariffs for some trading partners, imposing restrictions, or discriminating 
between nationals and foreigners.
45
 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on 
or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the 
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with 
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with 
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation 
and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or 
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
46
  
Thus, these principles advocated for equity and equality in trade without considering the 
dissymmetry of the member states in terms of their population, economic stability, political and 
social strengths and weaknesses.
47
 This view was supported by Hoekman B.,
48
 who asserts that 
states are different from each other. This contributes to the lack of willingness for members to 
fulfil their obligations under the WTO or other regional trade arrangements.
49
  
 
 
 
                                                             
45 Ibid 
46  Article 1 GATT 1947  
47Henrik H, Petros C. M, (2009). The WTO Case Law of 2006-2007: Legal and Economic Analysis. 
Cambridge University Press. Editors. 
48 Hoekman B, (2005). Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential 
Treatment. Journal of International Economic Law: 8 (2): 405-424 
49 Ibid 
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1.2.3 Criticisms of the EU Preferences 
As part of the objectives of the WTO,
50
 developed countries have often established a tariff 
scheme to stimulate export from developing countries, by lowering tariffs or granting duty free 
import from developing counties under the Generalized System of Preference (GSP)
51
 which was 
an exception to the principle of non-discrimination as stated in Article 1(1) of GATT.
52
 Based on 
this exception, the EU, granted preferential treatment to ACP countries under the GSP.
53
 It also 
established a system of Special Preferential Treatment in the Lomé agreement for specific 
countries in the ACP. These preferences came under heavy criticisms as early as 1965 for being 
unsuitable for developing countries. Criticisms came from both developed and developing 
countries that were not members of the ACP/EU trade regime.
54
 These preferences were 
interpreted as EC‟s trade expansionist mechanism, to discriminate amongst other WTO 
members, thus, defeating the purpose of the MFN.
55
 Despite the criticisms, the EU seemed to 
have taken advantage of the porosity and the lacunae that existed in the GATT framework to 
engage in some of its trade relationships with developing countries. Nevertheless, paragraph II of 
GATT Article 2(a) made provision for such trade preferences to developing countries in terms of 
tariffs and custom duties.
56
  
The criticisms prompted the member of GATT in 1965 to include Part IV of GATT which 
recognises the special need of developing countries at the time and asserts the principle of non-
reciprocity. It consists of Article XXXVI, XXXVII, and XXXVIII.
57
 These provisions place an 
injunction on developed countries, not to expect reciprocity in their trading relationship with 
DCs or LDCs.  The EU therefore, argues that her trade preferences to ACP countries which were 
and are largely developing countries were based on non-reciprocity and, fall under the conditions 
                                                             
50Gallagher P (2000), p. 96. Guide to the WTO and Developing Countries. Kluwer International Law. The main 
objective of the WTO is to eventually, eliminate all barriers to the world trading system.  
51 See Discussion on the EU GSP in chapter 3 
52 Beverly  M. op cit p. 77-78  
53 Patrick L. (1998). p.150 Trading Free, The GATT and the US Trade Policy 
54WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding Dispute DS27 
55 Beverly M. C, (2001) p. 76. MFN was aimed at a progressive and rapid reduction of tariffs views as the fastest 
way to liberalise world trade 
56 Ibid 
57 Kiplagate P. K, (1993) supra, p. 90. 
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laid down in the Enabling Clause,
58
 the GSP and under the exception of Article XXIV.
59
 The EU 
held that her trade arrangement with ACP states perfectly met those conditions as laid down in 
GATT for a country to derogate from the MFN
60
.  According to the principle of non-
discrimination, and non-reciprocity, such preferences were to be extended to all developing 
countries to comply with the condition for granting preferential treatment to a developing 
country. “Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting 
parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without 
according such treatment to other contracting parties.”61 
 Despite those conditions, the EU preference was only granted to ACP states, leaving out other 
developing countries.
62
 It is important to note that the issue creating controversy was not the 
preference itself but the conditions surrounding the preferences. Under GSP, preferences were 
conditioned on non-reciprocity and non-discriminatory basis. “The dispute between India and the 
European Communities (EC) stemmed from an EC Regulation which awarded tariff preferences 
to a closed group of 12 beneficiary countries on the condition that they combat illicit drug 
production (the Drug Arrangements). India brought the claim alleging that the Drug 
Arrangements were inconsistent with GATT Article 1(1) and unjustified by the Enabling 
Clause.”63 
 
Based on increasing criticisms, GATT members in 1971 adopted two waivers with the objective 
being to favour developing countries. The first waiver was aimed at bypassing the MFN 
principle, and allowing the use of GSP in favour of developing countries.
64
 The second waiver 
was aimed at enabling developed countries to grant preferences to other developing countries 
                                                             
58  “Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord 
differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment 
to other contracting parties.” The Enabling clause was incorporated into the WTO in 1994. 
59 Kiplagate P.K op cit 90 
60 Patrick L, (1998) p. 145-150. Trading Free: the GATT and the US Trade Policy. Twentieth Century Fund 
Press, USA 
61 Enabling Clause Article 1(1) 
62 62Kiplagate P. K, op cit p.90 
63 Grimmett  J. J, (2008) Trade Preferences for Developing  Countries. Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), Library of Congress. R22183   
64 Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903) available at www.wto.org <[Accessed on 13 November 2010] 
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without necessarily granting such preferences to developed contracting parties.
65
 The EU has 
applied especially the first exception to justify her continued preferences to ACP states.
66
 Again, 
mentions needs to be made of the fact that, though the EU applied the Enabling Clause, GSP and 
the exceptions of Article XXIV.
67
 The EU has since 1975 granted preferences under the Lomé I-
IV to ACP states, such as:  
 Non-reciprocal trade preferences 
 All industrial goods enter the EU duty free 
 80% of agricultural products enter the EU duty free, and the remaining 20% benefit from 
preferences.
68
 
ACP countries, under the Lomé Agreement invoked the waiver that was granted under the 
Enabling Clause permitting developed countries to grant non-reciprocal treatment to developing 
countries. During the Lome II convention, this waiver was granted to ACP states and made 
permanent at the Tokyo Round in 1979 under the Enabling Clause.
69
 ACP countries depended 
solely on this trade regime to access the European market.
70
 This kind of preferential trade 
regime, fall short of being compatible with WTO rules.  They did not meet the requirements of 
Article 1(1) and Article XXIV, therefore, were bound to come under increase criticisms.  
                                                             
65 Nwobike C.  (2008) p.90 
66 Patrick. L (1998) p. 149 Trading Free, The GATT and the US Trade Policy  
67 “Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord 
differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment 
to other contracting parties.” The Enabling clause was incorporated into the WTO in 1994 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm 
68Grynberg R. (1998). The WTO incompatibility of the Lome Convention Trade Provisions.  
<http://dspace.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/40346/1/sp98-3.pdf > [Accessed on 5 January 2009] 
69 Then in 1979, at the Tokyo Round, special and differentiated treatment encompassing the GSPs was also 
introduced on the basis of a decision entitled: „Differentiated and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries‟. European Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4, July 2004, pp. 439–462. 
70Naheed K, Calika N. (1994) p. 14-20 International Trade Policies: Background Paper. International Monetary 
Fund Available at 
<http://books.google.co.za/books?id=AUhPB9n7HZoC&pg=PA15&lpg=PA15&dq=ACP+and+MFN+scheme&sou
rce=bl&ots=EDk7rNNO7V&sig=MgSG4b54X5E0bxUGyINs4DENpjw&hl=en&ei=pLuSSoPQHsj3 [Accessed on 
5 January 2009] <QacuZHzDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false<[Accessed 
on 5 January 2009] 
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At the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Community‟s 
trade preference to ACP was criticized since it was seen as a direct violation of the exception 
under the GSP.
71
  
According to GATT 1947, countries were only allowed to derogate from the MFN principle if 
their trade preferences to any developing country were extended to all developing countries and 
were non-reciprocal.
72
 Secondly, according to Article XXIV exception, granting preferential 
treatment to developing countries was conditional upon the fact that such preferential treatment 
should envisage the creation a free trade area, or a custom union.
73
 The EU arrangement did not 
reflect such conditions as was seen in the special preferential treatment granted to ACP under the 
Banana and sugar protocol. A waiver was necessary for the EU to continue to grant preferential 
trade preferences to the ACP states, though, under GATT 1947 but not under the WTO.
74
 
 The rationale was that GATT 1947 did not provide for any mechanism through which countries 
that violate its laws were to be sanctioned and since a waiver could be sought for derogating 
from the MFN condition under Article IX and Article XXV.5, there was no limitation as to the 
duration of the waiver.
75
 
The coming into force of the WTO in 1995
76
 established a Dispute Settlement Body through 
which all members of the WTO could petition another member in case of a violation. A WTO 
waiver could only be granted for a period of one year and this would warrant the EU to keep 
coming to the WTO every year if such trade preferences were to continue.
77
 Cotonou replaced 
the Lomé IV agreement which had existed for close to two decades. Waivers could no longer be 
for an indefinite period as the case before GATT/WTO 1995. During the Doha Ministerial 
meeting of 2001, the WTO extended the waiver for EU to continue to grant preferential trade 
                                                             
71 Abass A (2004) .The Cotonou Trade Régime and WTO Law, European Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4, July 2004, 
pp. 439–462. 
72Grynberg R. (1998). The WTO Compatibility of the Lome Convention Trade Provisions 
http://dspace.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/40346/1/sp98-3.pdf<Accessed on 5 January 2009> 
73 Patrick low (1998)p.150 Trading Free, The GATT and the US Trade Policy 
74 Under the WTO, as shall be seen subsequently, waivers were non permanent. 
75 Feichtner I. (2008) Administration of the Vocabulary of International Trade: The Adaptation of WTO Schedules 
to Changes in the Harmonized System - Part II/II German Law Journal Vol. 9 No. 11. The legal requirements that 
waivers may only be of a limited duration and have to be reviewed annually did not exist under the GATT 1947 and 
were negotiated during the Uruguay Round. 
76 The WTO was created in 1995 by the Marrakech agreement. 
77 Grynberg R. (1998),   
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preferences to the ACP which was to end in 2007,
78
 while seeking ways to resolve the ambiguity 
that exist in the WTO rules themselves. However, the content of the Cotonou did not change in 
terms of scraping-off the inconsistent issues in relation to WTO compatibility; instead it added 
Development Aid into the new agreement.
79
 Under their successor, the Cotonou Agreement 
signed in June 2000, preferences were extended for eight more years (until the beginning of 
2008) for all countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, except South Africa, as well as most independent 
developing countries in the Pacific and the Caribbean.
80
         
The Cotonou Agreement introduced a system of gradual co-operation through negotiation by 
both parties to establish economic partnerships that will enhance trade and development through 
trade liberalisation, thus bringing an end to non-reciprocal trade arrangements.
81
 The new EPAs 
are being negotiated
82
 as a result of the expiration of the waiver granted the ACP/EC in 2001 
during the Doha Ministerial Rounds which permitted the EU to continue to grant preferential 
treatment to goods originating from ACP countries as provided by Article 36:1 of GATT 1994. 
The waiver which ended on 31
st
 December 2007 had to be replaced by a new agreement 
compatible with WTO rules.
83
  
The Cotonou Agreement stipulated that economic partnerships had to be negotiated before the 
end of December 2007 when the waiver granted to the EU was to officially come to an end.
84
 
                                                             
78 Grimmett J. J (2006) op cit p. 3. Regarding the Article XXIV claim, the 1994 report concluded that because the 
Lomé Convention involved non-GATT Parties, the Article did not cover the agreement and thus could not be used to 
justify the inconsistency with Article I of trade preferences for bananas imported from ACP countries.” The 
European Communities (EC) subsequently obtained a temporary waiver as per GATT Article 2:1 for the Lomé 
agreement; a waiver was later granted for the successor ACP-EC Partnership (Cotonou) Agreement until December 
31, 2007.  
79
 Robbins. P & Ferris, R. S. B. (2003).   The impacts of globalization on the agricultural sectors of East and 
Central Africa. (Organization of International institute of Tropical Agriculture. p. 29-32 
80 Henri-Bernard Solignac 2001 
81 Grimmett J. J (2006) op cit p.3. The non-reciprocal trade preferences that were a comer stone of the previous 
Lome Conventions will expire at the end of 2007 and be replaced in 2008 by a very different arrangement. As 
discussed already. These new trading arrangements were to be compatible with the multilateral trade rules of the 
WTO.  
82 The EPAs are being negotiated within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement. The Cotonou Agreement 
replaced Lomé IV as a temporary measure in 2000 and includes similar non-reciprocal preferential access to the EU 
market for certain ACP agricultural and other goods, through to the end of 2007. Trade provisions in the Cotonou 
Agreement have been sanctioned by a waiver granted by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). http://www.sia-
acp.org/acp/uk/index02.php#bottom>[Accessed on 25 June 2009] 
83 Grimmett J.J supra 
84 Article 37 (1) of Economic partnership agreements shall be negotiated during the preparatory period which shall 
end by 31 December 2007 at the latest. Formal negotiations of the new trading arrangements shall start in September 
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The implication of the new trend of events especially in the CEMAC region willing looked into 
from two fronts: the effects on CEMAC‟s LDCs, and DCs. Though a detailed analysis will be 
provided in the subsequent chapters, cognizance should be taken of the fact that LDCs 
automatically have been offered a different scheme, the Everything-But-Arms (EBA)  scheme.  
The Cotonou agreement, which is transitional, required that each member or economic group 
enter into an EPA with the EU for there to be a continuity of trade between the parties, that is, 
EU and ACP member states. As of 2008, only Cameroon in the CEMAC region had signed an 
interim EPA with the EU thus establishing continuity of trade while negotiations continue with 
other CEMAC members who are yet to negotiate an EPA.  
According to Article 45 (1)
85
 of the Cotonou Agreement, one of the issues agreed upon by the 
parties is the negotiation of a competition policy between the EU and ACP states during EPA 
negotiations. This research is based on the incorporation of competition policy in EPA and its 
effects on regional integration in the CEMAC region where there are great competitive 
challenges.
86
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2002 and the new trading arrangements shall enter into force by 1 January 2008, unless earlier dates are agreed 
between the Parties.  
85Articles 45(1) The Parties agree that the introduction and implementation of effective and sound competition 
policies and rules are of crucial importance in order to improve and secure an investment friendly climate, a 
sustainable industrialisation process and transparency in the access to markets. 
86 Gustavo R and Charalambos G (2007) 
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RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
1.3.1 Research Statement 
 
In this new era of globalization countries of the West or developed countries, are pressing hard 
through the WTO for a multilateral trading system that enhances increased market access 
especially by developing countries, to accelerate economic growth within their various regions 
and in the world trading system. Statistics have shown
87
 that trade flow among developing 
countries are far less than trade between developed and developing countries. In the CEMAC 
region in particular, an observation of the level of integration and competition in the Banking 
sector reveal that cross-border banking competition in the region is limited or otherwise absent.
88
  
There is the fear of an eventual European dominance in the region if CEMAC countries negotiate 
trade on competitive basis as this is one of the agendas of the Cotonou Agreement. Lucian Cemat 
expressed the view that “…foreign firms feel free to engage in across-anti-competitive 
behaviour, when the countries to which they are exporting do not have a competition law and can 
neither individually nor through cooperation with foreign competition authorities challenge that 
firm‟s market behaviour.”89 The aim of the thesis therefore is to ascertain the effects of 
negotiating competition policy between CEMAC and the European Community, to understand 
the level of CEMAC‟s legal preparedness, towards setting up a regional competition policy with 
the European Union.  
 
 
1.3.2 Research Question 
 
                                                             
87 Gallagher P (2000) p. 111-115 Guide to the WTO and Developing Countries 
88 Samer S & Vacher, J (2007): Banking Sector Integration and Competition in CEMAC (Abstract) 
http://www.competition-regulation.org.uk/conferences/southafrica04/Cernat.pdf>[Accessed on 25 June 2009] 
89 Cemat L. (2004). UNCTAD. p.8  The role of Competition in the promotion of competitiveness and Development: 
Experience from a sample of developing and least developing countries. Available at<http://www.competition-
regulation.org.uk/conferences/southafrica04/Cernat.pdf>[Accessed on 25 June 2009] 
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The research questions are as follows: To what extent will the incorporation of a competition 
policy in CEMAC/EU EPA affect CEMAC‟s regional integration?  Secondly, is CEMAC legally 
able to engage a competition policy with the EU? Thirdly, how will competition policy with the 
EU bring about increased integration in CEMAC? 
 
1.5.3 Research Methodology 
 
The research will be based on the available literature on the new economic partnership 
agreements that are in process, although not much has been written about the subject for the 
region. A critical analysis of available literature (books, journal articles and news reports) will all 
be relevant to the research. Information from the internet will also be of prime importance since 
most of the current debates on EPAs and competition policy are discussed through this medium. 
 
1.3.4 Research hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis of the investigation is that there will continue to be an economic downturn and 
continuous difficulties for regional integration to fully take effect in the Central African sub-
region if the competition policies are included in the current EPA negotiations with EU. The 
background of this hypothesis stem from the fact that since preferences have not been able to 
integrate and develop the economy of this region, incorporating competition policy in EPA 
which already is fraught with various challenges, competition policy may only worsen the 
situation of CEMAC. Since the economies of the countries that make up the CEMAC region are 
still developing and have very small private sectors, an EPA that leads to full liberalization of the 
market may obviously lead to the collapse of home industries which would not be able to 
compete with the more industrialised European industries. 
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1.3.5 Objectives of Research 
 
The objectives of the research are first, to evaluate the positive and negative effects on the 
CEMAC region if a competition policy is incorporated in the EPA with the goal of creating a 
competitive market between the European Union and CEMAC; and Secondly to make a finding 
on the legal ability of the CEMAC region vis-à-vis establishing a competition policy with the 
EU, that goes beyond its regional market. This is to ascertain whether the region is ready to 
negotiate a competition policy of the type that will lead to regional integration and eventual 
integration into the world economy, which is one of the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement. 
 
1.3.6 The scope of the Research 
 
Observing the developments that have taken place in the EU CEMAC relationship, relating to 
trade and development under the Lome Conventions, and in addition development aid under 
certain conditions in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, there is a lot to write about. However, 
this research is limited to the CEMAC region and its trade relationship under EPA. Furthermore, 
it is limited to discussing the impact of EPA enhancing regional integration, with particular focus 
on how EPA is disintegrating the CEMAC region instead of integrating the regional market. 
 
1.3.7 Chapter Outline  
 
Chapter one is an introduction to the entire thesis with respect to its background, objectives, 
research statement, the hypothesis and the research questions and limitations. It is divided into 
two sections; the first part gives an introduction to the thesis and the development of the 
problem. The second part focuses on the research statement, the research question, methodology, 
hypothesis, research objectives and finally concludes with an outline of the chapters. 
 The Second chapter gives an overview of the CEMAC Region. The chapter will discuss the 
formation of CEMAC and its institutional framework for integration. The aim of the chapter is to 
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examine the developments in the CEMAC‟s institutional framework for integration from the 
events that led to the creation of UDEAC.  
The third chapter will examine various trade instruments used to achieve the objective of 
regional economic integration in CEMAC such as non-reciprocal trade, under the Lome regime 
and will review the extent to which these instruments have contributed towards regional 
economic integration in CEMAC. It will concurrently examine the implications of EPA in the 
CEMAC region before and after 2007.  
Chapter four, will look at the legal effects of competition for integration. It examines the impact 
of competition policy within the current legal framework in CEMAC and the Cotonou 
Agreement. It will elaborate on the effects of competition policy on regional integration within 
the ambits of the CEMAC competition policy, Cotonou Agreement, the WTO. Finally, chapter 
five will draw conclusions from the findings and make recommendations.  
 
1.3.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has briefly given a historical development of the problem. It can be deduced from 
the above discussion that trade agreements with the EU started on a reciprocal basis with the 
AASM. At the Lome Convention, the ACP states were able to negotiate trade on a non-
reciprocal basis. From the forgone, the trade cycle of the EU and ACP states will soon complete 
its cycle of 360. That is, from reciprocity from 1959 to 1975, non-reciprocity from 1975 to 2007 
and now negotiations for trade on reciprocal bases. The chapter has also given the developments 
that culminated to EPA. In addition, it has provided the framework of the research in terms of the 
research statement, hypothesis, the research question, the methodology, the scope and the outline 
of chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CEMAC 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
CEMAC was created in 1994 by the heads of states from member countries-Cameroon, the 
Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
90
 
CEMAC is the “end product” of several treaties and agreements from 1910 to 1994. Thus, 
CEMAC replaces UDEAC, which was created in Brazzaville-Congo, on 23
rd
 June 1959.
91
 The 
CEMAC Treaty was signed to close the gaps created by UDEAC and to curb some of the 
problems that had emerged from the monetary and economic crisis of the 1980s. Prior to the 
signing of the CEMAC Treaty, certain objectives were set out in its predecessor agreements such 
as AEF, UDE, and UDEAC.
92
 These objectives include amongst others, the extension of national 
markets through the removal of barriers to trade within the region, equitable distribution of 
industrialisation projects, and free movement of persons.  By 1994, due the failure of UDEAC in 
financing the activities of the region, and the lack of a comprehensive structure for decision 
making, the Heads of State of UDEAC thought it necessary to broaden the scope of UDEAC and 
give it a wider meaning. This led to the constitutive Act creating CEMAC, in N‟Djamena, 
Chad.
93
 However, CEMAC only came into force in August 1999, after it was ratified by the six 
member states: Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.
94
  
                                                             
90 Preamble of CEMAC Constitutive Act 1994 
91 Shillington. K (2005)  Encyclopaedia of African history Vol.1 p.1636 
92 Akintan S. A op cit 168 
93 Bongyu. M. G, (2009). The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and the Decline of 
Sovereignty. Journal of Asian and African; Vol.44 p.389n Studies  
94 For the Treaty to take effect, the must unanimous ratification as provided by Article 57 of the CEMAC Treaty, 
1994 
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To understand the dynamics of regional integration in CEMAC, it is necessary to look at the 
historical developments in the region with the intention of contextualising the premise on which 
the current problem is based.  
 
2.1.2 The Creation of CEMAC and its Institutions 
 
In 1910, France created the France Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatorial Française (AEF)). Its 
members were Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Republic of Congo and Gabon.
95
 
These territories were not independent from France until the early 1960s. Since their political 
and economic policies depended on France, they were given representative positions in the 
French Parliament as associated territories.
96
 In 1945, as the surge for independence continues to 
gain grounds in colonial Africa, self-determination took roots. In that same year, the Colonies 
Française d’Afrique (CFA) was created in the AEF as a legal tender and a medium of exchange 
for goods and services.
97
 The acronym-CFA was later name Coopération Financière Africaine. 
The objective was to protect the economy of the AEF from the effects of the devaluation of the 
French Franc after WW II.
98
  
Regional integration exponents in the AEF advocated for a unified political and economic 
system to strengthen cooperation ties within the AEF. After several failed attempts were made by 
the Prime Ministers of the AEF to form a political and economic union, they succeeded in 
establishing the Equatorial Customs Union (Union Duanere Equatorial-UDE), in 1959. The 
UDE became the first regional institution created as a strategy for integration, and was signed in 
Brazzaville-Congo, on 23 June 1959.
99
 It had as objectives to extend the national markets of 
member states through the removal of barriers to intraregional trade, harmonies its fiscal policy, 
adopt a procedure of equitable distribution of industrialisation projects and the co-ordination of 
development programmes for various production sectors.
100
  
                                                             
95 Zafar A, and Kubota K (2003) p.2 
96 Ibid 
97 Ibid 
98 Ibid 
99 Shillington. K (2005) Encyclopaedia of African history Vol.1 p. 1636 op cit 
100 Akintan S.A, Law of International Economic Institutions in Africa 
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Cameroon became the fifth member of UDE in June 1961. The integration of Cameroon was 
economically beneficial to the AEF. Nantang J, states that by 1977, Cameroon accounted for 
over 50% of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the region.
101
 The “'Convention Regulating 
the Economic and Customs Relations between the States of the  UDE and the Republic of 
Cameroun', signed … in June 1961, did not create a customs union among the five countries, but 
rather a partial free-trade area between equal partners- the U.D.E. and Cameroon.”102 In addition, 
as a major economic giant of the region, Cameroon‟s integration into the UDE brought 
remarkable changes to the organisation, though some members saw it as a threat to their 
economic and political influence.
103
 In 1964, the UDE was transformed into Custom and 
Economic Union of Central Africa (Union Douniere Economique de la Afrique Central-
UDEAC), which came into force on 1 January 1965.
104
 
UDEAC was one of the oldest custom union institutions created in the Central African Sub- 
region to enhance integration. Its objectives were the same as its predecessor UDE, as stated 
above, that is, the establishment of a common market and monetary union. Under the UDE, a 
Solidarity Fund was created to compensate Landlocked Countries, that is, Chad and the CAR, for 
any loss of revenue incurred during their trade. Besides, it envisaged the harmonisation the fiscal 
policy of the member. These objectives were incorporated into UDEAC in 1964.
105
  
In an effort to harmonise its fiscal policy, a common Central Bank of the States of Equatorial 
Africa and Cameroon was created in 1959 (Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique Equatoriale 
et du Cameroun BCEAC).
106
 In the late 1970s, the BCEAC headquarter was transferred from 
Paris to Yaoundé, Cameroon. The BCEAC was officially handed to Africans and a new name 
given to the institution, BEAC (Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale).107 BEAC began to issue 
a common currency through a common central bank within the UDEAC sub-region. There are 
                                                             
101 Natang  J  (1986) UDEAC:  Dream Reality or the Making of Subimperial States. Institute of African Affairs at 
GIGA, Hamburg/Germany, Vol. 21, No. 2. pp. 211-223 
102Mytelka L.K (1974).  A Genealogy of Francophone West and Equatorial African Regional Organisations. The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 
103 Maurice W. Schiff, L & Alan W. ( 2003) p.98 
104Ibid  
105Mytelka, L.K (1974) op cit p. 16 
106 http://www.beac.int/index.html  
107Gulde A, Charalambos G. Tsangarides (2008), p.6. The CFA franc zone: common currency, uncommon 
challenges. International monetary Fund. 
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close to 51 commercial banks and 25 other financial institutions of the Central African states 
(treasuries, cash funds agencies, liquidity and guarantee funds management departments, 
clearing systems etc.).
108
  
However, UDEAC began to disintegrate immediately after its formation. Chad, CAR and Congo 
Kinshasa (formally known as Zaire Republic), left UDEAC in 1968 to form the Economic Union 
of Central Africa-UEAC (Union Economique de l’Afrique Central). This led to a series of crisis 
within the region. 
[In] particular, [ ] the severe crises of 1966, 1968 and 1984 caused by 
the withdrawal and return of the Central African Republic  and Chad; 
the successive economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, characterised 
by the inability of states to honour their [financial] commitments, and [ 
] caused UDEAC to suspend payments...
109
  
It can be deduced from the above that regional integration was not born on a “bed of roses” for 
UDEAC. Besides the economic crisis of those years, the principle of regional integration that 
started albeit timidly, was heavily affected by regional strives for dominance, a phenomenon that 
is yet to be eradicated from the political spectrum of the region. “[The] UDE helped attenuate the 
conflict between those leaders pressing for political unification and those who advocated a 
minimum infringement of national sovereignty.”110 These conflicts of ideologies still exist in the 
current leadership in the region. 
The UDEAC Treaty went through several modifications (1974, 1983, 1984 and 1991) before the 
1994 modification that led to its transformation into CEMAC.
111
 Equatorial Guinea later joined 
UDEAC on 1 January 1983. One of the main objectives of UDEAC was to stabilise the economy 
of the region, and ensure a balanced economic growth. In addition, it was aimed at giving a new 
and decisive impulse to regional integration in central Africa through increased harmonisation of 
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the policies and legislation of the various countries, to facilitate the much need regional 
integration for economic growth and development.
112
 
 
2.1.3 Why UDEAC failed 
 
Despite UDEAC‟s objectives of economic liberalization and the creation of a common market, 
its failure to attain regional integration has been blamed on several causes.  
First, it is argued that integration failed partly because it did not originate from within UDEAC 
but from outside the region. That is, the notion of integration was not originate from members 
but from former colonial master.
113
 UDEAC was one of those regional groupings that were 
immediately trapped into the EuroAfrican philosophy of the French.
114
 This resulted in 
inseparable colonial linkage with former colonial master-France.
115
 The establishment of a 
common central bank; its Paris Based Banque Centrale de l’Afrique Equatorial is evidence of 
the region‟s dependence on its colonial routs.  
 
Furthermore, the dependence on aid for development under the European Development Fund 
(EDF) continued to hamper regional competitiveness.
116
 This made UDEAC more of a French 
colonial entity, rather than a structure to facilitate development and integration in the Central 
African Sub-region.
117
 There was no incentive, no motivation for growth since there was always 
a guaranteed source of support. Alex E. Fernández Jilberto and Mommen A, assert that the 
French domination of the UDEAC economy caused it to follow a French pattern of trade which 
was not beneficial to the states.
118
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The exigencies of the lack of a common economic and political interest in the region, 
compromised by the demand for national economic and political interest, nation-building and 
domestic economic growth, overshadowed the process of regional integration in UDEAC.
119
 
 
Besides, preferential treatments among member states were also limited to a few products, which 
were contrary to the WTO rule on customs Union.
120
 Intraregional trade for example represented 
only 5% of UDEAC‟s total trade.121  According to Nantang J, Cameroon and Gabon account for 
32% of total intraregional trade. He argued that the lack of intraregional trade can be attributed to 
insufficient infrastructure in the region and the use of market opportunities.
122
 
 
Another strand of problems faced by UDEAC members that made integration difficult were the 
continuous instability of the region. The war in Congo and the Central African Republic were 
major setbacks to the regional integration process. Besides, conflicts within the UDEAC 
hampered its effort to integrate the economies. These conflicts have been partly blamed on the 
way distribution of the UDEAC Solidarity Fund (created under the UDE to compensate 
landlocked countries for the loss of customs duty) was managed. The dissatisfaction by Chad and 
the CAR prompted the creation of the UEAC which was chaotic for the region‟s integration. 
 Furthermore, there was scepticism as to the establishment of a common currency under a 
common monetary union. At the early stage of its creation, members were sceptical to commit to 
a strong monetary union for fear of loss of sovereignty, which has been a major obstacle to 
economic integration of the sub-region.
123
  
 
In 1981 UDEAC members, including Sao Tome and Principe and members of the Economic 
Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL),
124
met to form an umbrella organisation, the Economic 
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Community of Central African States (ECCAS). ECCAS only became active in 1992 and was 
recognised by the African Economic Community (AEC). 
The formation of ECCAS has increased the financial and human resources burden for many 
of the member states. 
Figure 1 
Multimember in Central Africa 
Country 
and 
Region 
Cameroon CAR Congo Chad Gabon Equatorial 
Guinea 
Sao Tome 
and 
Principe
125
 
The 
CEGL 
countries 
CEMAC √ √ √ √ √ √   
ECCAS √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
LCBC √   √     
AEC √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
AEC = African Economic Community, CEMAC = Central African Economic and monetary Community,  
ECCAS = Economic Community of Central African States, CEGL= Economic Community of the Great Lakes 
Countries, CILSS = Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel. 
 
Dual-membership in the region has also been blamed for the failure of UDEAC/CEMAC. Part of 
the reason for overlapping membership is the lack of identity. “The main problem lies in 
attempting to objectively delimit the area referred to as Central Africa. It has been difficult to 
situate central Africa.”126 This led to the creation of the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS) in 1983. The initiative to establish a wider forum for integration in 
Central Africa by UDEAC and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (CEPGL-
Burundi, Rwanda and the then Zaire), was to ease the tension between the two regional 
organisation. Yet the institution of a third regional organisation also meant increase in the 
administrative and financial burden on the member states. ECCAS was immediately paralysed 
by the lack of funds and lay dormant until 1999.
127
 In the same year, it was postulated by the 
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creation of ECCAS will subsequently result in conflict. This conflict, already exist between 
ECCAS and CEMAC.
128
    
 
2.2.1 CEMAC 
 
In 1994, the Heads of States of UDEAC met in N‟Djamina, Chad to revamp cooperation ties and 
to resolve the issues that had rendered UDEAC ineffective for over a decade from achieving 
regional integration. The outcome was the transformation of UDEAC into CEMAC. This was 
part of a wider initiative to boost the integration process.
129
 The reform established a common 
market by introducing a common external tariff, harmonisation of indirect tax with VAT, 
members agreed in principle to remove all barriers to intraregional trade, and the replacement of 
quantitative import restrictions with temporary import surcharges.
130
CEMAC is an institution 
with legal personality based on public law as per the 1994 Treaty. This was further expanded by 
Article 35 and 36 of the Treaty empowering the organisation to sign cooperation agreements 
whether they are sub-regional, regional or international.  The current institutional makes it 
capable of operating as an independent institution.
131
 
 
2.2.2 Institutional Framework 
 
Institutional development in the CEMAC sub-region has been lauded as a great step towards 
regional economic integration, such that, if harnessed, will accelerate its integration process.
132
 
CEMAC incorporate the institutional framework of its predecessor UDEAC, aimed at fostering 
the objective of a common market for goods, services, capital and eventual free movement of 
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people.
133
 The role played by the institutional framework for economic growth and development 
under UDEAC, cannot not be undermined.
134
  
The CEMAC regional institutions are harmonised to achieve the political economic and 
monetary objectives of the region. These institutions include; The Economic Union, the 
Monetary Union, the Regional Parliament and the Regional Court of Justice. The Economic 
Union which replaces the UDEAC Custom Union. The Monetary Union is responsible for 
handling the monetary policy issues of CEMAC, and has a regulatory organ- the Central African 
Banking Commission (COBAC).The Regional Court of Justice is composed of a Court of 
Auditors and a Judicial Bench.
135
 These strategic institutions have contributed towards the 
advancement of the region‟s integration process. Through these institutions, several reforms have 
been put in place, especially in the area of facilitating intraregional trade, transport, and tax. 
These reforms are part of an on going regional reform programme to ensure smooth integration 
process.  
In 2006, a transport facilitation programme was adopted to ensure the effective implementation 
of institutional reforms in the transport sector. It harmonised national regulation scheme to 
conform to regional policy and to facilitate the customs information technology system. 
136
 
CEMAC instituted a Common External Tariff (CET) in 2007, which is currently operational in 
the region. Besides, its members have also adopted the WTO custom valuation scheme excepted 
for Equatorial Guinea and Chad. Apart from the CET, indirect tax systems of the various states 
have been harmonised. In 2005, Cameroon carried out a tax reform programme as well as 
Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad which completely dissolve the Department of Tax, to 
set up an efficient system, in order to comply with regional policy frameworks.
137
 In addition, a 
common CEMAC passport, a common regional stock exchange has also been established in 
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Libreville to manage the free flow of capital, supervised by the Central African Financial 
Supervision Commission (COSUMAF).
138
 A careful observation of the development of the 
institutions in the sub-region, however, provides an appraisal as to the nature of its economic 
stagnation partly caused by the slow progress of the region‟s integration process.  
CEMAC institutions are modelled in the patterns of the EU. These patterns were adopted by the 
member states with the belief that the EU system is well structured and have been very 
successful for decades.
139
 The setting up of institutions without a strong binding rule to regulate 
the functioning and management of those institutions will certainly lead to a collapse of the 
institutions, causing a negative impact on its objectives. The failure of CEMAC in achieving its 
objectives could be partly blamed, among other causes, on the poorly managed institutions or on 
the nature of its regulatory policies. Strictly speaking, where there is overregulation there will 
certainly be limited freedom.
140
 Thus, it is not enough to create institutions, but to determine how 
these institutions are regulated for effectiveness and efficiency, to bring about regional 
competitiveness and integration. The focus here is to acknowledge the role that CEMAC 
institutions have played in its level of integration, but also to show that much is yet to be done in 
this regard, especially in terms of promoting regional competitiveness, through a regional 
institution that is aimed at regulating and supporting competition in the region.  
 In fact, it is postulated that countries with high-quality institutions are more likely to benefit 
more from international trade than those with poor institutional structures.
141
 Thus, Borrmann 
asserts that CEMAC falls among those countries in the ACP group with very weak institutional 
framework and they are likely not to benefit from EPAs. The literatures suggest that, trade 
restriction is higher in the CEMAC region than any other regional bloc in the ACP.
142
 Besides, 
the dismantling of tariff barriers makes the region the most vulnerable to suffer from the effects 
of the EPA- because of its weak institutions that may not be ready to embrace the shock of trade 
liberalisation.
143
 In the light of the above arguments, the CEMAC institutional framework for 
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integration has not benefited the region in order to facilitate economic growth. Trade policies are 
still restrictive, compared to the trade policies and custom union rules, of other custom unions 
within the ACP.
144
 The impact of these institutions on CEMAC is examined below.  
 
2.2.3 The CEMAC Economic Union (UEAC) 
 
The CEMAC Economic Union was established as a regional institution to strengthen and 
facilitate regional competitiveness and financial activities by harmonising the rules governing the 
operation of these activities, the harmonisation sectoral policies, to ensure the coherence of 
national fiscal policy and the establishment of the common market. To achieve these objectives, 
a five year plan of action was set up in Article 3 if the CEMAC Treaty.
145
 The period ran from 
1999 to 2004. Within that period certain regional goals were expected to be accomplished: the 
creation of conditions for the smooth functioning of the common market, develop a strategy to 
coordinate national agricultural policies, institute a process of ensuring the free movement of 
persons, goods and capital. Within the economic union is the CEMAC Customs Union. The 
importance of this institution is monumental in the region‟s integration history.146    
 
2.2.3.1 The Customs Union 
 
The CEMAC customs union was created in 1994 to revive UDEAC, which was created in 1964. 
From the UDE to the UDEAC, it accentuated that the members of UDEAC were committed to 
establish a regional economic structure that went beyond their national boundaries. Thus, the 
UDEAC/CEMAC customs union was established to liberalise the economy of members so as to 
facilitate economic growth which is the main objective of custom unions.
147
 
The customs union of CEMAC introduced:  
 A common external tariff; 
 Gradual removal of tariffs on intraregional trade which was completed in 1998; 
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 The harmonisation of indirect taxation; and  
 The replacement of import barriers to trade with temporary import surcharges.148 
 
The meaning and definition of customs union is provided in Article XXIV (8) of GATT 1947, 
which states that: 
For the purposes of this Agreement:  
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of 
a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that 
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, 
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, 
XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories of the union or at least with 
respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such 
territories, and, (ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, 
substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are 
applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of 
territories not included in the union;  
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or 
more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted 
under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in 
products originating in such territories
149
  
 
The above Article, articulates the key purpose of a customs union. In the CEMAC context, a 
customs union did not involve the reduction of tariff and tariff barriers only, but cuts across the 
social, cultural economic and political spectrums of the region. UDEAC was regarded as an 
economic union in a broader perspective, an agreement between two or more member states to 
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remove all barriers to trade between the parties. These barriers, as shall be seen subsequently still 
exist in respect of CEMAC trade.  
 
The trade regime under UDEAC suggested a substantial effort towards trade liberalization, 
through the establishment of a customs union, common market and single currency (the CFA 
franc), issued by a common central bank- BEAC, all of which has contributed towards achieving 
a certain degree of integration. In discussing the customs union in this region, cognisance is 
taken of the fact that the customs union in the region is largely associated to UDE. This was 
actually the first phase of integration- the customs union era.
150
  
 
The customs union in UDEAC/CEMAC created a free trade area within the region and a 
common market. A single external tariff was also established, which led to growth in 
intraregional trade of 25% in the early 1970s. However, the increase in intraregional trade did 
not last. What accounted for the decline was that the region lacked the infrastructure to manage 
the growth.
151
  
 
The UDEAC Treaty ambitiously sought to remove all barriers to intraregional trade without 
recognising the homogeneity of their products.
152
 In recognition that the UDEAC countries have 
“like products,” an incentive was created in the 1964 UDEAC Treaty to boost intraregional trade. 
One of such incentives was the establishment of the Single Tax System (Tax Unique).
153
 The 
Single Tax System provided that industrial products manufactured in, and sold within the Union, 
was subject to the Single Tax System.
154
 Thus, as an incentive, the marketing of industrial 
products that extends to other member states were exempted from the Single Tax System which 
facilitated industrial development.
155
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 However, by the 1970s, intraregional trade was greatly limited to unprocessed agricultural 
products, and other raw materials.
156
 Even though economic liberalization was the final 
objective, a number of the Treaty‟s provisions were rather restrictive. The Single Tax System 
limited the trade amongst members by identifying a few products that could be considered for 
intraregional trade and competition.
157
 Free trade in manufactured product was limited via the 
establishment of the system within the custom union.
158
 The domination of Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) in the region, explains why competition within the sub-region was, and is 
greatly limited or otherwise absent.
159
  
 
In addition, under the Single Tax System, intraregional trade was further limited in that industrial 
products not named under the treaty could be imported by member state, but will be taxed based 
on the common external tariffs imposed on all products not originating from UDEAC.
160
 The 
introduction of a tax policy not contemplated under the WTO in the Congo economy, further 
increased its restrictiveness, including a restrictive policy that already exist under the CEMAC 
agreement itself.
161
 The import of sugar, cigarettes, and drinks from non-member countries are 
still subject to a temporary 25% surcharge, which were scheduled to be removed by 2000.
162
 The 
result has been a slow intraregional trade which has stifled the integration process in the region. 
 
When UDEAC was transformed into CEMAC in 1994, the objective was to facilitate regional 
trade since its predecessor had been largely ineffective. The current situations show that the pace 
of implementing regional customs rules is still slow.  
 
The occasional double taxation of landlocked-countries-bound 
products at the ports of entry (mainly Douala port) and the 
administrative roadblocks along the Douala-Bangui and Douala-
Ndjamena axes have raised the transaction costs for CAR and 
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Chad importers to inordinate levels: for example, the average cost 
to import a 20 foot container from Douala to Chad/RCA is about 
4,000euros, i.e. four times the cost of maritime transport from 
Europe to Douala).
163
 
„The implementation of the agreed regime by the member countries, however, has remained 
unsatisfactory.” 164 This is an example of inefficiency and ineffectiveness that characterize the 
regions‟ institutions. 
 
2.2.4 The CEMAC Monetary Union  
 
Regional integration may take the form of a monetary union, free trade area, customs union, a 
common market and economic union.
165
 Where a particular region chooses to use the 
methodology of a monetary union, it is expected to adhere to the rules thereof. A monetary union 
functions through the operation of a central monetary authority which issues a common currency 
to all member states.
166
 CEMAC is a combination of an economic union (Union Economique de 
l’Afrique Centrale-UEAC) and monetary union (Union Monetair de Afrique Centrale-UMAC). 
The Constitutive Act of CEMAC signed in 1994 harmonised the two structures to form a 
monetary and economic union.
167
 CEMAC replaces the UDEAC customs union to establish a 
framework for sub-regional integration through a common monetary policy.   
Within this framework, a regional central bank was established to give a face-lift to regional 
integration processes. The creation of BEAC as a regional monetary authority was applauded to 
be a great move towards economic integration strategy of the Central African Sub-region. In 
spite of resistance and the lack of commitment at the time of its creation, due to the fears of some 
members to commit to a strong monetary policy, the institution has stood the test of time. 
Reforms carried out by the Heads of States in 1973, transferred the headquarter of BEAC from 
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Paris to Yaoundé. Besides, its management was also transferred to Africans and the voting power 
of the French terminated.
168
 The most important of the reform was the maintenance of the fixed 
parity to the French Francs that existed since its creation. Despite criticism of the fixed parity, 
and the economic crisis of the 1980s, BEAC was not given the authority to devalue the CFA.
169
 
The monetary union, which was evidenced through its single currency, had been instrumental as 
tool for development in the sub-region. This had led to the convergence of macroeconomic 
policies partly drafted by BEAC which oversees the monetary policy of CEMAC.
170
 Besides 
BEAC, the Banking Commission of Central Africa (COBAC) regulates the entry into the 
banking sector in the CEMAC region.
171
 Despite COBAC‟s supervisory rule in the Union, its 
independence is still pending. COBAC is headed by the Governor of BEAC which makes it 
difficult for the regulatory organ to operate as an independent entity. BEAC as well is not 
independent from the executive branch of CEMAC government. The Heads of States are the 
custodian of policy in the region and therefore, the central bank does not truly decide on policy 
issues. . “COBAC and BEAC need to be reinforced and their independence properly 
guaranteed.” 
In addition, the Central African Development Bank (BDEAC) is the main financial institution 
aimed at financing regional integration projects within CEMAC. In 2007, reforms were carried 
out to boost the activities of BDEAC 
 
BDEAC has put in place a strategic plan for the 2008-2012 period 
and a series of measures to enable the institution to fulfill a number 
of roles: to become the principal source of financing development in 
CEMAC, a major actor at the level of the regional financial market, 
a sponsor of the financing of regional integration, and a key 
institution for private financing in the region.
172
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However, the extent of BEAC facilitating competitiveness in the sub-region
173
 is yet to be 
realistic. Indeed in the views of Saab Samer, Competition in the banking sector is still very 
absent. Though the financial market in CEMAC is largely dominated by banks, the sector is 
under developed. Banks are sparsely located in the region. One third of the 35 credit institutions 
in the region are located in Cameroon, while the other is located in Gabon.
174
 
 
2.2.5 The CEMAC Regional Parliament (RP) 
 
Regional parliamentary democracy is a political phenomenon that is gradually paving its way in 
the African democratic system. Regional Parliaments have been established in many economic 
groups in the world including African countries since the early 1990s. Within Africa, the concept 
was first implemented by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), and recently the CEMAC region. The 
CEMAC RP is among the four regional institutions created under Article 2 of the CEMAC 
Treaty. In April 2000, CEMAC members unanimously agreed to establish an Inter-Parliamentary 
Commission, at the CEMAC heads of states submit in N‟Djamena-Chad. Besides its supervisory 
role, one of its objectives has been to ensure democratic monitoring of the community‟s 
institutions and its organs.
175
 
The Community Parliament (CP) is charged with the duty of monitoring the institutions and the 
decision-making organs of the organisation. The objective was to contribute to regional 
integration through a process of debates and dialogue. The activities of the Parliament which 
started as albeit timidly as a parliamentary commission had five members appointed by the 
Heads of States of CEMAC.  The outcomes of the Commission‟s work are published as Reports 
or resolutions. The Commission was also authorised to review the Annual Report of the 
Executive Secretary, after which a report is submitted for hearing to the President of the 
Ministerial Committee, and the Executive or the Governor of BEAC.
176
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Though CP was established in 1994, its structures were only fully established in April 2010 at 
the inauguration of the CP‟s headquarter in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. 
This a particularly important occasion for my people… and I 
wish to show my feelings of gratitude for the confidence that was 
given to my country with this important institution, whose work 
is to consolidate democracy, dialogue and tolerance for the 
progress of our people and to evolve in our activities with 
complete transparency. The defense of the current analysis 
system, the ability of our States and of our human resources and 
the circulation of goods require the adoption of appropriate 
government systems. Integration must be for us an African 
renaissance that allows us to project out future.
177
 
Speaking during the ceremony, the President of the CEMAC Parliament, Pierre Ngolo, stated 
that “[Their] role in the process of integration must be like a lever, to promote good governance 
and proper balance among the powers, as well as to instil and promote the community spirit”.178 
The 30 member Parliament is composed of 5 members from the 6 states that make up the 
CEMAC region.
179
  
From the above statements, it is clear that the member states are aware of the contribution of the 
CP to advance regional integration. However, as mentioned before, the effectiveness and the 
efficiency of the institution will depend on the amount of loos of sovereignty and control that the 
states are ready to offer to allow a smooth functioning of the institution.  
 
                                                             
177 President Obiang, at the inauguration of the Community parliament on 20th April 2010, available at< 
http://www.guineaecuatorialpress.com/noticia.php?id=481 >[Accessed on 9 December 2010]  
178 Ibid 
179The Report: Gabon 2010. Oxford business Group, available at 
<http://books.google.co.za/books?id=69tc87BdhCsC&pg=PA89&dq=cemac+parliament&hl=en&ei=hzACTeaAM4
aN4Ab2kuWlCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=bookthumbnail&resnum=1&ved=0CCcQ6wEwAA#v=onepage&q=%
20parliament&f=false  >Google book, [Accessed on 9 December 2010]  
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2.2.6 The CEMAC Regional Court of Justice 
 
The CEMAC Court of Justice is a regional institution charged with the duty of ensuring judicial 
compliance in the execution of regional activities by the institutions and organs of the region. It 
was established by Article 5 of the CEMAC Treaty and Article 73-74 of the Convention of the 
UEAC. In 2008, the Treaty was modified and the jurisdiction of the court set out in its Article 
10, 46 and 48. Its headquarter is based in N‟Djamina, Chad. The court which has a judicial 
chamber and an audit bench is composed of thirteen judges elected from a college of judges 
within the region. 
 
The President of the Court is assisted by two judges elected from the chambers. 
180
 The objective 
of the court is to ensure compliance of regional laws such as the CEMAC Treaty, compliance 
with regards to the obligations of states vis-à-vis regional institutions and their respective organs. 
In addition, it is also a dispute settlement institution for member states and the CEMAC 
community members.
181
 
 
The CEMAC Court of Justice and the Parliament seem to play more of a supervisory role. The 
RCJ seats in two benches - the judicial and the audit bench. However, the methodology of 
application follows a rather pragmatic approach. Coupled with the fundamental problem of 
limited level of sovereignty, the implementation and enforcement of regional objectives largely 
depends on member states.  
 
Observing that the need for a supra community regulatory structure to oversee the entire 
regulatory framework, neither the RP nor the CJ, has the prerogative to ensure complete 
regulation of CEMAC institutions and organs. These structures are yet to be given sufficient 
powers to bring the necessary regulation that the community needs. 
  
“The CEMAC audit report ... pointed out that eight years after the official inauguration of the 
community Court of Justice, this court‟s enforcement powers remained limited in practice. Its 
                                                             
180 < http://www.cemac.int/institutionsCEMAC.htm#institution >[Accessed on 9 December 2010] 
181 < http://www.cemac.int/institutionsCEMAC.htm#institution >[Accessed on 9 December 2010] 
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output seemed small, as it had made only 17 judgments and given five opinions in its five years 
of existence. National courts had never referred any preliminary question (application for 
interpretation of community law) to the chamber, nor had any member state or the executive 
secretariat ever referred matters of legality of national instruments, in the light of community 
treaties and conventions, to it.”182 
 
2.2.7 The CEMAC Organs 
 
The above notwithstanding, the Conference of Heads of States (CHS) is the Supreme Organ of 
the region. This organ oversees and decides on policy issues as well as guides the actions of the 
economic union and the monetary union. With directives from the Council of Ministers, the 
decision of the CHS is binding on all members states once they are ratified. In the organisational 
structure, after the CHS is the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers govern UEAC. 
Given that its objective is to ensure the harmonisation of community economic laws and 
regulations, in 2000, the Council of Ministers adopted the CEMAC Civil Aviation Code to 
facilitate intra-CEMAC Air transport and a joint Competition Regulation. The Council is 
composed of Ministers of Finance and Economic Affairs of the six member states. Whereas the 
CHS meet once a year, the Council of Ministers meet twice a year. 
183
 
 
Another organ of relevance is the Ministerial Committee in charge of the UMAC. It is charged 
with the role facilitating monetary policy within the region to ensure that national economic 
policies are in conformity with community regulations and monetary policies. The Central 
African Banking Commission (COBAC) headed by the Governor of BEAC function as a 
regulatory organ of financial institutions of the region. This organ is directly placed under the 
supervision CHS. It is only empowered to make recommendations. It does not have any 
prerogative to make binding decisions. Nevertheless, its role is important in stabilizing the 
economic and monetary policies.
184
  
                                                             
182 Jeune Afrique/L’intelligent 2005a, cited in Côme D. G. A (2008) 
183 < http://www.cemac.int/institutionsCEMAC.htm#institution >[Accessed on 9 December 2010] 
184< http://www.cemac.int/OrganesCEMAC.htm#organe2 >[ Accessed on 9 December 2010] 
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2.3.1 Conclusion 
 
The institutional reforms in the region should not be underestimated. The CEMAC region is one 
of few regional economic groups within the ACP to have made great strides towards regional 
integration. The establishment of the above regional economic community in 1994 and most 
recently the inauguration of the CEMAC Parliament in Malabo by the Heads of States of 
CEMAC is an indication of a positive outcome. “[The] opening of the Community Parliament is 
fruit of our common will expressed from the institution.”185 Thus the four basic institutions are 
the Economic Union, the Monetary Union, the Regional court of Justice and the regional 
Parliament. Since the trade regime under UDEAC and its institutions was faced with numerous 
obstacles, the decision of the Heads of States in 1994, from the above discussion seem to be 
yielding fruits of integration. 
 
The CEMAC has put in place these fundamental institutional structures to facilitate its 
integration process. However, being one of the first African regions to establish a monetary 
union and customs union, its full integration still lags behind when compared to other regional 
economic bloc in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
First, it can be deduced from the literature that a fundamental problem exist in the sub-region, 
that of slow intraregional trade. One of the reasons behind this problem is that the products in the 
region are homogenous in nature, and basically raw materials, which are mainly exported to 
Europe and other developed countries.  
 
Secondly, the CEMAC laws are protective in character especially the tax system. Investors are 
likely to be taxed twice for their products, especially if they are produced in one of the member 
states and sold in more than one state within the region. The laws impose tariffs above the WTO 
limit. Furthermore, CEMAC institutions were created for other economic activities and not 
necessarily for the integration of these activities within the region. These concerns and more will 
be elaborated upon as trade practices within the region in the subsequent chapters.  
                                                             
185 Denis Sassou, at the inauguration of the CEMAC Parliament. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CEMAC LEGAL INSTRUMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE  
 
3.1.1 Introduction 
 
The relationship between the ACP states and CEMAC can be likened to that of yolk and the 
embryo of an egg, such that it would be practically impossible to discuss trade practices in 
CEMAC without reference to the ACP trade regime under the Lomé Conventions and CA. 
As earlier mentioned, the first Lomé Convention was signed in 1975. Between 1975 and 
2000, four successive agreements were negotiated. These agreements formed the legal 
framework for trade and development between EU and CEMAC in the last three decade.
186
 
 The CA was signed on the 23
rd
 of June 2000, and is believed to be the most comprehensive 
trade agreement between the EU and the ACP states. Taking a retrospect of the 
development of the relationship between the EU and the ACP, the trade relationship 
between these two groups of states, was facilitated first, by the Lomé Conventions.
187
 
Though these trade agreements were preferential in character, causing the ACP to access 
the EU market duty free, on non-reciprocal basis, they also included financial assistance 
and commodity stabilization instruments. The CA replaced the Lomé Conventions in 2000. 
This new agreement which will be revised every five years, will last for 20 years, a period 
which according to the CA, is reasonable enough for a new trade regime to be put in 
place.
188
After the renegotiation of Lomé IV agreement that birth the Cotonou ACP/EU 
agreement, CEMAC, as well as most ACP groups, was immediately faced with the 
challenges of the new framework for trade, both regionally and internationally.  
This chapter focus on some of the most important instrument used by the EU and the ACP 
in achieving their objectives of cooperation and aid agreement under the Lome era and EPA 
                                                             
186 Delport, C.E, (2005) Towards a Fair Multilateral Trade Relations Between the European Union and Africa 
Caribbean and Pacific countries. The University of the Western Cape-Library.  
187 See chapter 1 above 
188 Article 37 of Cotonou Agreement 2000 
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in the Cotonou era. Thus, only those that are of prime importance to this thesis will be 
discussed. 
Several factors necessitated the signing of the CA of 2000. First, the ACP economy, for 
over 25 years was increasingly facing a decline in its exports to the EU market. This was an 
indication that preferences were not working for the ACP states. Secondly, the 
establishment of the EU common market in 1992 and the increase in membership of the 
EU, coupled with the EU Green Paper of 1992, contributed in shaping the trade relationship 
between the EU and the ACP. In addition, the establishment of the WTO in 1995 the 
strengthening of its Article I rule on non-discrimination, made it difficult for the EU to 
continue its preferences under the Lomé IV.
189
 
The changes that have occurred in the last forty years between the EU and the ACP have 
not only affected trade between the two parties but have drawn the attention of non-ACP 
members and other developed countries to pierce the veil of the EU/ACP partnership. The 
discussion below is aimed at looking at the effects of those trade instruments on CEMAC 
and its regional integration efforts. 
 
3.1.2 Non-reciprocity to Reciprocity 
 
To evaluate the extent to which there has been a paradigm in CA, one would need to look 
back to the former regime. The Lomé trade regime had as a pillar to it, the principle of non-
reciprocity.
190
 It was well established in, Article 7 of Lomé I that, “In view of their present 
development needs, the ACP States shall not be required, for the duration of this 
Convention, to assume, in respect of imports of products originating in the Community, 
obligations corresponding to the commitments entered into by the Community in respect of 
imports of the products originating in the ACP States…” This was a clear derogation from 
the general rule of non-discrimination under GATT Article 1 provision. The principle of 
                                                             
189 Hennie S (2007), p. 133 to 137. Will Cotonou Succeed where Lome failed? Heinonline 32 s.Afr. Y.B Int‟L 
190 Delport, C. E. (2005) Towards a Fair Multilateral Trade Relations Between the European Union and Africa 
Caribbean and Pacific countries. The University of the Western Cape-Library. An elaborate discussion of the origin 
of Lome Convention has been discussed in the this cited thesis. 
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non-reciprocity as seen under the Lome I agreement was made with an understanding that 
contracting parties had, in 1966, unanimously agreed to exclude Developing Countries 
(DCs) worldwide from the GATT framework, which had establish a certain normative 
standard of trade. In order for this to happen, part IV was added into the GATT trade 
regime, which allowed developed countries to discriminate amongst other developed 
countries in granting preferences to DCs, “based on Article XXV.5 [of GATT 1947 which 
set up a generalised system of preferences (GSP) on a „non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory basis‟ to be applied by developed countries in favour of DCs, by way of 
exemption to the MFN treatment under Article 1”.191 The rational was to increase export, 
facilitate industrialisation, and accelerate economic growth in DCs worldwide.
192
 
 
 According to Abass A, the Lomé trade preference though legally correct in terms of its 
nature and content, was not open to all DCs as provided by GATT GSP, but was specific to 
ACP states and therefore came under heavy criticism. The EU preference to the ACP was 
discriminatory because it was not extended to other DCs. In addition, EC/ACP tariff 
scheme was also brought under spotlight for review, at the UNCTAD conference. These 
were some of the lacunas of the Lomé Conventions. These gaps led to the criticisms that 
followed for over ten years.
193
 The banana protocol for example was most prominent and 
was greatly criticised by the United States and other non ACP DCs which were also banana 
producers.
194
 
 
The European Union [had] set up a Market Organisation 
permitting preferential access for bananas from ACP countries 
to the Community market through import quotas (857,000 
                                                             
191 Abass A, (2004). The Cotonou Trade Regime and WTO Law. European Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4, July 2004, 
pp. 439–462.Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004, UK. 
192 From Lome to Cotonou Western Africa – SIA Civil Society Consultation Workshop Dakar, 4 & 5 nov 
2003<http://www.sia-acp.org/acp/download/wa_sccw_brief_2_-_from_lome_to_cotonou.pdf >[Accessed on 27 Oct. 
2010] 
193 Abass A, (2004). op cit 
194 The EU banana case with Latin American countries was finally settled in December 2009 with Latin American 
countries going victorious. According to EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, "This has been one of the most 
technically complex, politically sensitive and commercially meaningful legal disputes ever brought to the WTO," 
World Trade Organization director general Pascal Lamy said. "It has also been one of the longest running 'sagas' in 
the history of the post-World War II multilateral trading system." < http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,5017556,00.html > [Accessed on 27 October 2010] 
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tons) that [were] not subject to tariffs (the banana protocol). 
This organisation of the European banana market penalises 
non-ACP exports. Under pressure from American 
multinational banana corporations, the United States, Ecuador 
and Guatemala are among the countries that have lodged a 
complaint to WTO. The Market Organisation for bananas has 
been condemned twice, in 1997 and again in 1999. As a result, 
the banana Protocol [was] abolished in 2006 and replaced by a 
tariff-only system.
195
  
 
With the elimination of non-reciprocity, the ACP states especially the DCs,
196
 are expected 
to reciprocate under the new regime. This new dynamics of the ACP trade has been quite 
challenging for these countries. 
3.1.3 STABEX and SYSMIN 
 
Another important aspect of Lomé Convention that has experienced a paradigm is the 
elimination of the STABEX (Stabilization of Export Earnings) and SYMIN (System of 
Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products) trade protocol which ran from 1975 to 
2000. This was repealed under the Cotonou trade regime. It was aimed at establishing the export 
of ACP states with particular reference to agricultural products.
197
 The stabilisation of export 
prices, under the Lomé trade regime was a benevolent initiative granted to ACP states to carter 
for eventualities resulting from unanticipated shortfalls in commodity prices. The objectives 
according to Khan S.A, were meant to compensate ACP states in the event of such a fall in 
prices. Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea, CEMAC members, benefited from the 
scheme in 1992- 1993 and 1994-1995 respectively.
198
 “Despite [its] shortcomings, all ACP 
countries [that benefited] from Stabex have gained from the system. Stabex funds [were] 
                                                             
195 http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5017556,00.html > [Accessed on 27 October 2010] 
196 LDCs and LLDCs have been brought under EBA scheme as will be seen subsequently in this chapter. 
197 Article 186 of Lome Convention 1975 
198EU Annual Reports: STABEX (Stabilization of Export Earnings) EU annual and periodic reports (837) 
ACP/AASM (74) < http://aei.pitt.edu/view/euannualreports/stabex.html > [Accessed on 30 October 2010] 
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unconditional aid […] used to finance, for example, general or sectoral import programmes, debt 
relief, reforms to restructure the sector concerned or compensatory payments to farmers and 
stabilisation of producer prices”199 
 
However, the scheme was only made available to countries that prove that they have suffered 
substantially in their export. One of the limitations of the scheme was that it was time consuming 
to establish causation in other to benefit from it.
200
  “The EU had to see if the request is justified 
before any payments [were] made.”201 Indeed the system had been criticised for not covering all 
products from the ACP. Due to the fact that STABEX and SYSMIN were attached to the Lome 
Conventions, the end of the Lome Conventions in 2000 automatically rendered the systems 
obsolete.
202
 The two systems have now been replaced by the European FLEX and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) scheme.  
 
3.2.1 The Cotonou Agreement - A New Paradigm  
The main objective of the CA is, according to Article 1 of CA, “Reducing and eventually 
eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual 
integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.” 203  
From the look of things, the CA can be described as development tool to assist ACP countries in 
developing a sustainable economic, political, social and cultural strategy for integration. 
Stemming from the fact that the four Lomé Conventions had failed to integrate the ACP 
economy in general and CEMAC in particular, regionally and internationally albeit preferential 
treatment through non-reciprocity trade regime, the continuous economic degradation of ACP 
states especially those in Central African Sub-region is a cause for concern.
204
  
                                                             
199 Gabriella Koehler 1997. Issues Paper prepared for the Summit of ACP Heads of State and Government  
Libreville, Gabon 
200 Khan S. A (2006). Volatility of Resources Inflows and Economic Growth in CEMAC Countries, North-South 
Institute, Ontario 
201 Ibid 
202 Gabriella Koehler 1997. Issues Paper prepared for the Summit of ACP Heads of State and Government  
Libreville, Gabon 
203 Article 1 of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000. 
204 Klilagat P.K.1992, 593   
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The growing criticism of EU trade regime in the late 1980s prompted a shift in the EU trade 
policy to DCs especially ACP states.
205
 The consequence is that, in order to be WTO compatible, 
the EU was bound to comply with the multilateral framework for trade-non discrimination. The 
new ACP/EU trade regime has officially erased the non-reciprocity principle and replaced it with 
reciprocity. This has sparked off a general out cry as to this new paradigm; considering the 
vulnerability of the economies of the ACP states. The challenge therefore, is too high, due to the 
fact that ACP states must ensure that their products are of standard to be able to face competition 
in the EU market from other DCs that are non ACP members. In the Libreville submit of ACP 
Heads of States, the states men acknowledged the need for compliance with the multilateral 
framework when they said: 
 
We reaffirm our commitment to discharge our international 
obligations to adhere to and promote a fair international trading 
system. Nevertheless, we are deeply disturbed by the prospect of 
disruption in our fragile and vulnerable economies and 
disintegration of the social fabric of our countries which would 
arise from the insensitive application of WTO rules and 
obligations, as potently demonstrated by the recent ruling of the 
WTO Appellate Body on the EU Banana regime.
206
  
This was a plea being made to the international community to recognize that non-reciprocity was 
only going to cause more harm to the economies of these states. It was against this backdrop that 
the Cotonou Agreement was negotiated to give the ACP states ample time to improve on the 
competitiveness of their products. The Heads of States acknowledged the gaps that existed 
between EU and the ACP with respect to WTO compatibility rules. 
                                                             
205 “At the same time, I am very aware that these EPAs have come in for much criticism in the NGO community. 
Some consider there is nothing for it, but that they should be scrapped” Speech by Peter Mandelson, EU Trade 
Commissioner. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/jan/20/development.internationalaidanddevelopment>[Accessed on 28 
October 2010]   
206Libreville Declaration, Adopted by the First Summit of ACP Heads of State and Government Libreville, Gabon, 7 
November 1997 
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One of the fears raised by the ACP Heads of States had been based on the lack of asymmetry 
between EU and ACP. According to the current EU Commissioner Peter Mandelson, in an effort 
to erase the fears raised by ACP Heads of States, said 
 
Let me stress, up front, that our EPA agenda is emphatically not 
about opening markets to our own export: it is about opening 
European, as well as crucial regional markets to developing 
counties and enabling them to take advantage of these 
opportunities. To comply with our WTO obligations there has to 
be an element of reciprocity in these agreements, but there will 
be no equality in these obligations. Our ACP partners will only 
be expected to open their market progressively over a long 
period, and only as their capacity to trade allows.
207
 
The speech by Peter Mandelson seem to answer one of the questions of this research: what will 
be the outcome of the CEMAC trade if placed on the same platform for trade with regards to 
equality in partnership? Though there is no complete answer that question, Mandelson seems to 
suggest that the EU shall not compete with CEMAC in trade. On the one hand, CEMAC and 
other developing countries are made to understand that there shall not be equality looking at the 
economic, political and social gaps between the EU and the CEMAC states. On the other hand, 
the introduction of reciprocal trade and the proposal of the EU for a competition law with 
CEMAC under the Cotonou trade regime, contradicts the statement of the EU trade 
Commissioner. The rational is that, by imposing or rather erasing the non-reciprocity trade 
practice, only open the CEMAC market to highly competitive European producers.  
 
In addition, Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome seems to unveil the plan that the EU had had as 
seen in the current trade agreement with CEMAC. Article 238 provides the legal basis for the EU 
to trade “with one or more States or international organisations agreement establishing an 
association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions and special procedures.” 
                                                             
207 EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, on 23 May 2005 at the Inter committee of European Parliament. 
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CEMAC is one of those associations as provided in Article 238 above, implying that that current 
changes in policy had been, and is only being implemented in full.  
 
A third observation is that, erasing non-reciprocity is a return to unconditional MFN
208
 which is 
covered under Article 1 of GATT. MFN was introduced as the backbone of the multilateral trade 
scheme to avoid preferences that had jeopardised world trade in the 18
th
 Century. Under the 
MFN principle, a country was precluded from discriminating against other contracting parties. 
The rule simply states that “…any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties.”209  
 
However, faced with the option under EPA- the opening up of CEMAC market, involving 
substantially all trade (which is yet to be defined) will eventually lead to unfavourable 
competition for an economy that is crawling to take roots, to face very stiff competitor. This may 
result in the collapse of home industries. The fears of the CEMAC states are legitimate. The EU 
members had expressed the same fears in opening up markets to the ACP, which prompted the 
EU to institute the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to protect its home industries. 
 
Most CEMAC countries apply MFN to all countries. Consequently, the opening up of markets to 
include substantially all trade may eventually mean the opening up of markets to other 
developing countries that are far more advanced than the CEMAC countries. This means that the 
CEMAC region may not only face competition from EU, but from other developing countries as 
well.
210
 According to the above Article, the EU is “expected to exercise the utmost restraint in 
seeking any concessions or contributions for commitments made by them to reduce or remove 
tariffs and other barriers to the trade of such countries [CEMAC]”. The EU must recognise the 
particular need of these countries so as not to place them in a more difficult situation. In 2005, 
                                                             
208 For details on Conditional and Unconditional MFN, see Rubin S. (1980) Most-Favoured Nation Treatment and 
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Quiet Revolution. 6 Int'l Trade L.J. 224 (1980-1981). 
209 Ibid 
210 Article XII GATT 1947 
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UNECA statistics show that CEMAC recorded the least in trade creation compared to other 
regional blocs in the African continent.
211
 
 
Furthermore, the erosion of non-reciprocity automatically 
repeals paragraph 5 and 6 of the enabling clause. Paragraph 5 
and 6 reads: 5.       The developed countries do not expect 
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations 
to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of 
developing countries, i.e., the developed countries do not expect 
the developing countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to 
make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual 
development, financial and trade needs. Developed contracting 
parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall less-developed 
contracting parties be required to make, concessions that are 
inconsistent with the latter‟s development, financial and trade 
needs. 
6.         Having regard to the special economic difficulties and 
the particular development, financial and trade needs of the 
least-developed countries, the developed countries shall 
exercise the utmost restraint in seeking any concessions or 
contributions for commitments made by them to reduce or 
remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of such countries, 
and the least-developed countries shall not be expected to make 
concessions or contributions that are inconsistent with the 
recognition of their particular situation and problems.
212
 
This raises doubts as to the consistency of WTO rules with regards to developing countries. 
Despite whatever justification that is advanced to this paradigm in the CEMAC trade relationship 
with EU, it renders the WTO rules inconsistent and ambiguous in its content and practice. 
                                                             
211 Roza V, 2006),  p.26. Adjusting to the effects of the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements 
212 Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Enabling Clause. 
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Addressing the incompatibility issue should not have led to a more uncomfortable situation for 
the DCs- CEMAC in particular. The WTO rules especially Article 1 (5) (6), needs to be 
renegotiated or repealed because reciprocity towards some DCs makes it incompatible.  
 
Lomé had also been criticized for being incompatible with WTO rules, non-discrimination. It 
was necessary to look for an alternative to boost the economies of ACP states, as well as to 
comply with the WTO rules.  Since trading between the EU and ACP was on a decline, there 
needed to be a way forward. EPA was one of the major developments of the Cotonou Agreement 
between the ACP states and the EU. After about 18 years of negotiations, the trade regime of 
most ACP states began to experience a paradigm, from a cooperation trade relationship to that of 
concession through reciprocity and competition.
213
 At the onset however, the Cotonou 
Agreement did not stop the former trade practices under Lomé but sought for a way out to create 
an alternative that will benefit both the EU and ACP.
214
 For this to take place, the members of 
the ACP had to form regional groups and negotiate as regional blocs. The aim was to create 
Regional Free Trade Areas in Africa as per Article XXIV of GATT, in other to ensure 
compliance with rules on setting up Regional Trade Agreements (RTA), and Free Trade Areas 
(FTAs).  
 
3.3.1. Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)  
 
The Cotonou Agreement (CA) was based on three forms of partnerships: Development 
Cooperation, Political Dialogue and EPA.
215
 These three forms of agreements are not 
independent of each other but form the complete package of the CA.  EPA was the most 
appropriate and most available trade instrument to the EU and the ACP during the negotiation of 
the CA to replace the Lomé IV trade and aid agreement. The main reason for EPA was based on 
the fact that the principle preferential access to the EU market by ACP states came to an end in 
                                                             
213 CEMAC countries that signed the Cotonou agreement are Cameroon, Chad, CAR, Congo Equatorial Guinea and 
Gabon. 
214 Article 36(3) of Cotonou Agreement as read together with Annexe V attached to the Agreement. Annexe V 
restates the majority of the provisions of Articles 167–185 of Lome 
215 Article I of CA 2000 “The partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating 
poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries 
into the world economy.” 
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2007. That is, though CA was negotiated in 2000, it did not erase the former preferences to ACP 
until 2007. The principle of non-reciprocity which had governed trade between the two parties 
since 1975 officially came to an end on 31 December 2007. It was on these bases that EPAs are 
being negotiated.
216
 
A second reason why EPAs had to be negotiated, stem from the 1996 dispute between the 
EU/ACP on the one hand and Latin American countries and the US on the EU banana preference 
to ACP. The EU/ACP banana protocol worked against the non-ACP banana producers who also 
wanted better access to the EU market. Furthermore, in 2006 Ecuador challenged the EU‟s 
import regime of bananas from the ACP, one of ACP‟s export covered by Lomé IV.217 These 
additional circumstances necessitated the negotiation of EPAs, so as to comply with the rules of 
trade under the WTO. It is against this backdrop that the CA was negotiated in 2000. The CA 
erased the non-reciprocity.  It also provided a date of expiry of the trade instrument, while 
instituting the EPA.
218
 
The third reason and most fundamental was base on the fact that the Lomé Agreements were 
incompatible with GATT/WTO rules on non-discrimination. EPA replaces the non-reciprocity 
trade instrument under the Lomé Conventions. Thus for EPA to compatible with WTO rules, 
they must meet the condition of Regional Free Trade Agreements (RFTA) under Article XXIV 
of the WTO. The first test is that EPA must not discriminate against non-EPA members by 
raising barrier to the products of non members to the EPAs. Secondly, EPAs must include 
substantially all trade in the RFRA. The two tests are applied to ensure that EPAs are WTO 
compatible.
219
 The challenge however, lies in the interpretation of the second test (substantially 
all trade). According to Chimugwuanya N, it will be difficult to diagnose the intentions of the 
EU until a clearer definition of the term „Substantially All Trade‟ is given under the current EPA 
regime.
220
  
                                                             
216 Marsha D. (2007) p. 2. Getting To Know EPA. Available at < http://www.crnm.org/rnm_updates.htm >[Accessed 
on 16 October 2010] 
217Ibid 
218Bartels L. (2007), p.52. Trade and Development Policy of the European Union . Oxford University Press . 
European Journal of International Law 
219 Article XXIV GATT 1994 
220Chimugwuanya N, (2008). The WTO Compatible ACP-EU Trade Partnership: Interpreting the Reciprocity 
Requirement to Further Development. Online Journal 8 Aspec Review.Int’l Bus.Trade L.87  
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The Appellate Body‟s decision in the case of Turkey‟s textiles, was to the effect that: “neither 
the GATT Contracting Parties nor the WTO Members have ever reached an agreement on the 
interpretation of the term „substantially‟ in this provision. It is clear, though, that „substantially 
all the trade‟ is not the same as all trade, and also that „substantially all the trade‟ is something 
considerably more than merely some of the trade…”221 
 
Despite the above conditions, EPA will still be discriminatory to other non EPA members. 
Nevertheless, such discrimination will be compatible with WTO rules because they operate 
under RFTA. However, the condition of Article XXIV still leaves DCs in a state of stupor 
because trade between EU and DC in CEMAC cannot be placed on the grounds of equal 
partnership. The situation that led to the principle of non-reciprocity may emerge again in the 
future as it did in the 1960s, being one of the events that prompted the formation of UNCTAD. 
DCs still have little to offer to stand in competition with developed countries.
222
 The underlying 
problem (as was believed then) was that developed countries, demanded for developing countries 
commodities was less than developing country demand for developed country industrial 
goods.
223
  
With the understanding that there are advantages associated to EPAs, such as the opening up of a 
wider market for CEMAC products, investment promotion for local industries to compete in the 
international market, duty free and quota free access to the EU market, improved quality of 
goods and  services through competition etc, these advantages can only become realistic if the 
CEMAC regional market is effectively liberalized and effective competition and competition law 
is applied to prevent anti-competitive behavior and the protection of consumers.
224
 In the 
CEMAC context, EPA may likely lead to double opportunities for both consumers and 
producers. Increase in import will be beneficial to consumers while increase in export will 
benefit producers. But as mentioned above, the second advantage may not become very visible 
for CEMAC producers with their relatively low productivity scale compared to the EU.  
                                                             
221Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, Paragraph 48, cited in EPAS AND WTO COMPATIBILITY – A 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE. Analytical Note SC/TDP/AN/EPA/27 November 2010 Geneva. Available at  
http://www.southcentre.org/ [Accessed 22 December 2010]  
222 Bartels L. ( 2007), op cit 10 
223 Ibid 
224 Marsha Drakes (2007), op cit p.5.  
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Two principal issues need to be addressed with respect EPA. The ACP non-LDCs have to 
reciprocate to the EU and open up markets, while LDCs which do not join EPA, will have to 
operate under the Everything-But–Arms (EBA) option, to maintain their preferential access to 
the EU market. They are not expected to open up their market to the EU. The implications are 
very glaring when examined within the context of CEMAC‟s regional integration strategy. An 
analysis of the impact of EPA on CEMAC is provided below. 
 
3.3.2 EPA and CEMAC Disintegration 
 
Due to the long and short term effects of EPA, some schools of thought have argued that EPAs 
are no guarantee to economic growth and development, for economies of region such as 
CEMAC, nor is there any guarantee that it would lead to the integration of CEMAC to foster 
economic growth and integration.
225
   One of the questions that this chapter seeks to answer is 
the extent to which the signing of EPA would lead to regional integration. It examines certain 
trade rules, both from the perspective of the EU and CEMAC, which restrict trade rather than 
liberalizing trade.   
It is hoped that EPA will bring benefit to developing countries. These potential benefits are only 
an expectation on grounds that all things remain the same. The establishment of EPA albeit 
advantageous from the perspective of the EU and the Cotonou Agreement, will result in the 
differentiation and may eventually disintegrate the integration process that has been nurtured for 
decades. EPA has qualified and reclassified ACP countries in terms of their trade potentials and 
economic viability- DCs and LDCs. Under the EPA arrangement, LDCs are not obliged to 
negotiate EPA with EU. DCs however, have only the EPA option and are being pressurised to 
negotiate EPA or lose out from financial assistance granted by the EU under the European 
Development Fund (EDF),
226
 and the continuation of free access to EU market.  This 
classification has affected several trade blocs within the ACP including CEMAC.  
                                                             
225 Roza V, (2006) Supra 
226 The EDF was created by the 1957 Treaty of Rome to grant Technical and Financial Assistance to ACP Countries 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/overseas_countries_territories/r12102_en.htm.< Accessed on 5 
October 2010>  
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The reclassification of ACP states under EPA is causing disintegration within the ACP and its 
regional groups. In the CEAMC region the situation is complicated as three of the region‟s 
members are classified as LDCs, two among which are LLCs and three are DCs. In this respect, 
EPA should not be regarded as an instrument for integration. EPA would do well in a region that 
has all its members classified as DCs; such that the conditions are non- discriminatory and 
integration may likely emerge on a safe platform. The rational behind the above assertion on 
EPA are based on a number of factors associated with EPA. These have been discussed below. 
 
3.4.1 The Generalized System of Preference 
 
Mindful of the economic weakness, in a highly competitive economic world, developed 
countries in the mid 20
th
 Century opted under the Enabling Clause of GATT 1947, to accord 
special and differential treatment to developing and most especially least developed countries. 
According to Article 1 of GATT, which sets the general principle of GATT, it states inter alia 
that: 
“With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on 
or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the 
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with 
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with 
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 
2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties...”227 
The aim of the provision was to prevent countries from discriminating against other trading 
partners. The principle was termed the Most Favored Nation principle (MFN). However, looking 
                                                             
227 GATT Article 1 
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at the special needs of developing countries, the Enabling Clause was introduced as an exception 
to MFN.  Due to increase in world trade, developed countries have often sought ways to create 
an economic empire that guarantees the supply of basic raw material and other basic necessities. 
At the Tokyo round in 1979 the Generalized System of Preference (GSP)
228
 was introduced and 
adopted to allow developed countries to grant preferences to developing and least developing 
countries which, under normal circumstances would be considered a violation of the MFN. This 
trade regime which lasted for close to three decades, granted preferences to developing countries 
in the form of duty free access to developed countries‟ markets. 
It was on these bases that the EU granted trade preferences to ACP countries with the objective 
of revamping their economy and making it more competitive in the world market. These 
preferences fell under the category of preferences in Article 1(b).
229
 Under the EU GSP to ACP, 
which was an exception to MFN, the EU could not at the same time grant the same preference to 
other developed countries as provided by the MFN. The EU was precluded from granting such 
preferences under the GSP, as per the Enabling Clause.
230
  “Notwithstanding the provisions of 
Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and more 
favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to other 
contracting parties”231 
  
3.4.2 Effects of European Union GSP Scheme on CEMAC 
  
The EU GSP is a trade preference that replaces the formal non-reciprocal trade regime 
under the Lomé Convention, giving way to the EPA.
232
 This trade preference was granted 
to ACP group of states. The EU groups these preferences into three categories; GSP, GSP+ 
and EBA or as represented below; 
                                                             
228 Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903) .This decision by signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT “CONTRACTING PARTIES”) in 1979 allows derogations to the most-favored nation (non-
discrimination) treatment in favor of developing countries. In particular, its paragraph 2(c) permits preferential 
arrangements among developing countries in goods trade. It has continued to apply as part of GATT 1994  under the 
WTO < http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm  > [Accessed on 19 October 2010] 
229 Op cit GATT Article 1 
230 Ibid 
231Ibid 
232 McQueen M (1999). The Impact Studies on the Effects of REPAs 
between the ACP and the EU. University of Reading. 
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 “The standard GSP, which provides preferences to 176 Developing Countries and Territories 
on over 6200 tariff lines;  
 The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, 
known as GSP+, which offers additional tariff reductions to support vulnerable developing 
countries in their ratification and implementation of international conventions in these 
areas;  
 The Everything-But-Arms (EBA) arrangement, which provides Duty-Free, Quota-Free 
access for all products for the 49 Least Developed Countries (LDCs).”233  
The importance of GSP is to enable developing countries access to the EU market, putting them 
on a better platform against other competitors. It is hoped that such preferential access will result 
in poverty reduction and create sustainable economic growth for developing countries or least 
developing countries. However, despite this free access to the EU market and the reduction of 
tariffs, the duration of the scheme is renewable every three years. The first bloc of GSP to DCs 
started in 2009 to end in December 31
th
 2011. To qualify for GSP+ countries had to have ratified 
certain international conventions such as human rights and good governance policies.
234
 
“Each developing country wishing to avail itself of the special 
incentive arrangement had to submit a request to that effect by 31 
October 2008, accompanied by comprehensive information 
concerning ratification of the relevant conventions, the legislation 
and measures to implement effectively the provisions of the 
conventions and its commitment to accept and comply fully with 
the monitoring and review mechanism envisaged in the relevant 
conventions and related instruments. To be granted the request, the 
requesting country also has to be considered to be a vulnerable 
country as defined in Article 8(2) of Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008.”235 
                                                             
233< http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/ > [Accessed on 20 
October 2010] 
234 See Annex 2 
235COMMISSION DECISION of 9 December 2008  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:334:0090:0091:EN:PDF  > [Accessed on 20th 
October 2010] 
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CEMAC non-LDCs also qualify for GSP as they are listed amongst the “vulnerable” countries 
that were eligible for GSP +.
236
 However, CEMAC LDCs like Central African Republic, Chad, 
and Equatorial Guinea, are already benefiting from EBA.  
An advantage exist for CEMAC LDCs in that they have two opportunities open to them with 
regards to which trade regime they would prefer for their export to the EU. While for the non 
LDCs of CEMAC, at the time of negotiating an interim EPA, the GSP+ was an alternative to 
prolong negotiations of EPA without losing out the market. At present, EPA seems to provide a 
better option for CEMAC non-LDCs.
237
 One key limitation to the GSP+ is that its constant 
review may lead to the disqualification of an eligible DC, thus causing an adverse effect on trade 
and economic and social development. An example is the recent of Sri Lanka which has been 
eliminated from the EU GSP scheme. Secondly, though the GSP+ “covers a lot of products but 
not those of greatest interest to the ACP non-LDCs, like bananas, there have been suggestions 
that GSP+ could be extended to cover these products. Furthermore, the EU GSP is associated 
with several obligations that needed compliances.
238
 
“In truth, […] under GSP+, the ACP non-LDCs would still be 
paying something near to € 750 million of additional customs duties 
a year. GSP+ covers a lot of products but not those of greatest 
interest to the [CEMAC] non-LDCs, like bananas. There have been 
suggestions that GSP+ could be extended to cover these products. 
This is nonsensical as it is potentially equivalent to opening EU 
markets for these products simultaneously to major ACP 
competitors. This would instantaneously kill [CEMAC] exports by 
removing the tariff advantages they have over more competitive 
producers”239 
 
                                                             
236 See According to article 8 of the COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 732/2008 applying a scheme of generalised 
tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and amending Regulations (EC) No 
552/97, No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and No 964/2007: 
237 Ibid 
238 See Appendix 2 
239< http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/september/tradoc_136097.pdf > [Accessed on 20th  October 2010] 
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3.4.3 Everything-but-Arms (EBA) 
 
When the Cotonou Agreement called for preferences to continue, the EU opted to adopt a 
new paradigm for LDCs through the introduction of the EBA initiative as an incentive to 
cause LDCs to enter into EPA, through quota-free and tariff free access to the EU market. 
The CA ended the era of non-reciprocity between EU and ACP and for the whole of 
CEMAC
240
 by replacing the unilateral trade preference with an EPA, which is now 
regarded as the new framework for CEMAC‟s trade with the EU. 
The new initiative provides for a quota free but added a tariff free access to LDCs. The resultant 
effect has been disintegration caused by the differentiation especially at the beginning of 
negotiation when CEMAC LDCs had to stay on the fence by taking an observer status, since 
there was an alternative trade arrangement- EBA that provided better options for LDCs. 
241
 
Under the CA, one of the aims of EPA is the promotion of regional integration within each 
regional group in ACP.
242
 It is argued that such differentiation may affect the Common External 
(CET) Tariff initiative in CEMAC. Since EPA has erased the non-reciprocity preferences, this is 
however only related to developing countries that enter into EPA. Thus the implication for 
regional blocs is to the effect that since there is no reciprocity under EBA, “…it is unlikely that  
LDCs will provide improved access to imports from the EU unless they receive other benefits for 
the doing so.”243 This leaves LDCs to a position where there is no incentive for both regional and 
international competitiveness.  
One other lacunae of EBA are that since it is aimed at establishing FTA, its compatibility with 
the WTO may soon be questioned. Any such arrangement must be WTO compatible, as per 
Article 24(5). Compatibility would mean that EBA has as objective to standardize trade and 
development through preferences and aid, to create a competitive economy. Disintegration is 
likely to exist after EPAs because it is argued that EPAs turn to strengthen bilateral free trade 
with EU from the perspective of self-determined regional grouping.  
                                                             
240 EU preferences to the ACP/CEMAC, under the Lome Agreement ended in 2007.  
241 Brenton P and Manchin M (2003), Making EU Trade Agreements Work: The Role of Rules of Origin’.       
Blackwell Publisher. 
242 Cotonou Agreement Article 29 
243 Hinkle E.L and Schiff M (2004) 
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This “Divide and Rule policy” was first instituted by the French on their colonies. The formation 
of two separate trade arrangement within a single region is problematic and only fan the flames 
of regional disintegration rather than integration. Multiple memberships are also contributing to 
slow down integration efforts. CEMAC members are also members of ECCAS and AEC
244
. 
Overlapping membership and the fight for self-determination and recognition only act as a 
limitation to regional integration. While the EU is negotiating as a single trade entity, many ACP 
states are divided into ineffective regional groups instead of as a single trade bloc-ACP.    
A key point of note as one tries to pierce the veil of EBA is that it goes a long way to fan-the-
flames of the flaws that already exist in CEMAC regional integration process. Deviations from 
the CET still exist in CEMAC. This is due to the fact that not all CEMAC members are 
implementing the CET rules.
245
 According to Waerzeggers C, CEMAC trade is hampered by the 
fact that each country is expected to enforce CET for the benefit of the member state and not to 
the community. The Community Levy (Prelevement Communautaire de Solidarite), is still being 
owed by some members.   Such disregard for the CET, which is CEMAC‟s main component of 
its import taxation regime,
246
 only leads to deviations. Where there is a deviation from the CET, 
as a result of EBA. This makes EPA a tool for disintegration of existing structures within the 
sub-region. EPA ought to increase free trade and intra regional trade within the CEMAC region 
that will eventually exert pressure on the MFN tariff in order to facilitate the mobility of factors 
of production.
247
 
Thus, with the current EBA initiative LDCs have nothing to lose if their trade is not liberalized. 
Trade liberalization for regional integration purpose ought to come from LLCs, LDCs, and DCs 
or any given regional group for there to be an effective integration. It is feared that where 
liberalization is coming from a few members, the CET and CU structures may be forced to 
decline with time.
248
 One proposal to this effect is the inclusion of DCs into the EBA 
arrangement, so as to ensure that integration, the expected objective of EPA and CA, are not 
                                                             
244 Economic Community of Central African States. (See chapter 2) 
245 Martijn, J. K, Charalambos G. T, (2007) Op cit 
246 Oliva M, (2008) 
247 Krever R, (2008) 
248 Hinkle E.L and Schiff M (2004) 
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jeopardized. Furthermore, to ensure compatibility, EBA should be incorporated into FTAs and 
RTAs.
249
  
The above however, is not totally in disregard to the advantages the EU-EBA sought to bring 
within LDCs in ACP and non ACPs. One of such was to ensure that EU preferences are 
compatible to WTO rules.
250
 It is a unilateral trade preference to LDCs though it is non 
contractual in nature. It is also not time bound like the Cotonou Agreement or the previous EU 
GSP under Lomé Agreement. This non contractual nature of EBA only makes it risky and 
unrealisable for the LDCs that have signed it. 
3.4.4 The Rules of Origin (RoO) 
 
“„Rules of origin‟ are the criteria used to define where a product 
was originally manufactured. They are an essential part of trade 
rules because a number of policies discriminate between exporting 
countries: quotas, preferential tariffs, anti-dumping actions, 
countervailing duty (charged to counter export subsidies), and more. 
Rules of origin are also used to compile trade statistics, and for 
„made in ...‟ labels that are attached to products. This is complicated 
by globalization and the way a product can be processed in several 
countries before it is ready for the market.”251 
The principle of the application of Rules of Origin (RoO) was to combat distorted trade practices 
and through restricted quotas, tariff preferences, anti-dumping actions, countervailing measures, 
that were usually charged on exports. These trade rules have since become another tool to 
propagate the already restrictive practices amongst states. Under the CA, and the EU GSP 
system, there seem to be an increase in trade restriction. A comparison of the CA and the African 
                                                             
249Ibid 
250 Bhattacharya D, Rahman M, Riahan A, (2004). P. 12-15. The EU-EBA Initiative: Market Access 
Implications and Potential Benefits for Bangladesh. Centre for Policy Dialogue, Bangladesh. 
<http://www.cpd.org.bd/pub_attach/OP43.pdf > [Accessed on 2 October 2010] 
251 <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm9_e.htm#origin> [Accessed on 1 October 2010] 
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Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
252
 showed that the AGOA is less restrictive when 
applying the AGOA RoO which requires that the rules be applicable only where the product was 
assembled.
253
 AGOA, albeit its expiry date of 2008, was extended to 2015. Under the scheme, 
small countries have been given the lee way to use foreign fabric to garment export to the United 
States (US).
254
 
This hurdle that must be overcomed in CEMAC is yet to meet another challenge. CEMAC 
members are also members of ECCAS. These regional economic institutions operate under 
different RoO. This make application difficult within the CEMAC sub-region thus stifles the 
effort of integration.  
In an effort to harmonize the instruments, ECA in collaboration 
with CEMAC and ECCAS, organized an expert group meeting in 
January 2007 in Douala, Cameroon, to elicit concrete proposals 
for harmonizing trade instruments in the sub region. Experts 
agreed on the definition of common rules of origins for CEMAC 
and ECCAS. For a good to be considered as originating from 
CEMAC and ECCAS, its processing should reflect 40% of local 
raw material and 35% of value-added transformation. Participants 
to the Douala ad'hoc experts‟ group meeting also recommended 
the adoption of a single CEMAC/ECCAS certificate of origin 
aligned on the current ECCAS model.
255
 
The practice of this trade rule was applicable within CEMAC until the signing of the CET which 
eliminated the RoO within the CEMAC region albeit in principle. The restrictiveness of the 
CEMAC RoO is a contributing factor to the slow economic growth and the lack of 
                                                             
252 The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a tradepreference agreement granted  by the United States 
(US) to Sub-Saharan African countries. “ AGOA significantly lowers, through 2015, trade barriers to goods 
exported from African countries, provided that they have established or are making progress toward market-based 
economies, enhancing the rule of law, representative governance, lowering barriers to U.S. trade and investment, 
improving human rights, and other goals.” This trade agreement is similar to the EU trade preferences to ACP states 
under the CA of 2000. 
253 Aadeitya M, Devesh R and Suhbramanian A, (2003). African Growth and Opportunity Act and its Rules of 
Origin: Generosity Undermined, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford UK 
254 AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004 
255 http://www.uneca.org/integration/numero1/highlights02.asp <Accessed on 6 October 2010> 
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competitiveness. Brenton argued that RoO have been used by developed economies as a tool for 
restriction when it is incorporated into FTA. Though with the aim of reducing tariffs or identify 
the eligibility of goods for free access into a particular market.
256
 With such protectionist 
tendencies, a FTA which is the final objective of the Cotonou Agreement with the EU, on first 
sight, should not be embraced as a vital instrument for regional integration in CEMAC, unless 
conditions within the community are favourable for the effectiveness of its enforcement. 
Furthermore, the applications of RoO, in terms of preferences to developing countries also mean 
that CET should not be applied within a FTA. On the other hand, where such diffusion does not 
exist, CET could be applied. Two types of RoO are generally applicable: preferential RoO and 
non Preferential RoO. It is important to note that the issue of concern here is to deal with 
preferential RoO which is related to FTA. However, CEMAC before the signing of the CET 
applied both RoOs.
257
 Under the WTO RoO are set to operate under a non preferential basis. 
There are no general rules with regards to RoO. Indeed since the early 80s, efforts have been 
made to see the harmonisation of RoO worldwide. However, the complexity of setting up a 
multilateral RoO is a challenging one.  
GATT has no specific rules governing the determination of the 
country of origin of goods in international commerce. Each 
contracting party was free to determine its own origin rules, and 
could even maintain several different rules of origin depending 
on the purpose of the particular regulation. The draftsmen of the 
General Agreement stated that the rules of origin should be 
left:„...within the province of each importing country to 
determine, in accordance with the provisions of its law, for the 
purpose of applying the most-favoured-nation provisions (and 
for other GATT purposes), whether goods do in fact originate in 
a particular country‟.258 
                                                             
256 Brenton P, (2003). Integrating the Least Developed Countries into the World Trading System: 
The Current Impact of EU Preferences under Everything But Arms 
257 Olivier C, (2006). The origin of goods: rules of origin in regional trade agreements Oxford University press 
258 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm9_e.htm#origin <Accessed on 1 October 2010> 
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Without any solution coming from the WTO, RoO has in time only resulted in a floodgate of 
disputes emerging from the arrangements of quota as in the Multifibre Arrangement and the 
“voluntary” steel export restraints. Some of these problems include an increase in preferential 
trade arrangement, anti-dumping laws, and several disputes base on determining the origin of 
goods.
259
 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
 
According to the EU agenda for regional integration in CEMAC, integration is expected to take 
place in the form of partnerships. While CEMAC members have been working hard to ensure the 
integration of their economies leading to a free movement of persons, (which has been done 
through the establishment of common market and common monetary policy) the EU proposals 
seem to suggest an integration involving members of the ECCAS. According to the EU 
integration strategy for Central Africa, this involves an expanded membership of three DCs and 
five LDC, two of which are LCs.
260
 Among the DCs that ought to negotiate EPA, only 
Cameroon has initialled an interim EPA which was concluded in 2009.
261
Gabon and Congo 
currently trade under the Generalised System of Preference. This strategy may lead to a more 
complex situation for Central Africa and CEMAC in particular. In addition, EPA, as earlier 
mentioned, despite the has as objective of facilitating regional integration, the current trend in 
CEMAC, coupled with statistical results from UNECA report for 2005, CEMAC is the least 
integrated Regional Economic Community in Africa. Thus, the EU suggestion will only worsen 
the integration efforts of the region. However, looking at the CA, ACP states have a choice to 
decide the terms of their trading arrangement with the EU which includes competition policy.
262
  
It is important to note that the CEMAC situation shows that such terms are masterminded by the 
EU.
263
 Thus the current EPA, which not all of the members of the Central Africa have initialled, 
may only lead to disintegration of the region after 2020. Within the scope of regional integration, 
the current trade arrangement for CEMAC, if at all the EU is interested in regional integration  
                                                             
259Ibid 
260 The EU is negotiating the integration  
261<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wideragenda/development/economicpartnerships/negotiations-and-
agreements/#_central-africa >[Accessed on 1 November 2010] 
262 Cotonou Agreement 2000 
263 Paolo V, (2007) 
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within CEMAC, should take the form of single trade framework. The rationale is that these 
countries could better function under the EBA, rather than EPA. They are all vulnerable 
countries of the EPA trade arrangement.  
This chapter has provided some of the legal instruments governing CEMAC international trade 
and how they affect the trade relationship between the EU and CEMAC. Though they are not 
limited to those mentioned above, the trade in the CEMAC region is, besides the multilateral 
framework for trade under the WTO, have bilateral trade agreements with other non CEMAC 
members such as Nigeria, China and the United States of America. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN CEMAC 
 
4.1.1 Introduction  
 
The practice of competition and the enforcement of competition laws were first instituted in the 
United States shortly after the Second World War (WW II). These laws were enacted to regulate 
state monopolies in the sugar, rail transport and banking sectors of the economy. It was further 
emulated by Germany and Japan after WW II, and later by the majority of developed economies 
across the globe.
264
 Since then, the concept has been institutionally and politically promoted by 
governments and international organisations. In the mid twentieth century, several institutions 
such as the UN and the WTO, have since engaged in facilitating the establishment and 
enforcement of competition laws in international trade. Through UNCTAD, technical assistance 
is being given to encourage, train and develop capacity in UN member states, more especially 
DCs.
265
  
 
For purposes of this research, the phrases, competition law and competition policy, will be used 
interchangeably. However, it is necessary to note here that competition policy carries a deeper 
meaning than competition law. According Marcos F, the scope of competition policy is wider in 
terms of economic liberalisation, market interventions, industries, investment and trade 
policies.
266
 Though competition law and policy may be difficult to separate, one is a subset of the 
other, that is, competition law is a product of competition policy. It becomes incumbent on 
CEMAC policymakers to understand the implications of their decisions both in the present and 
in the future.  
It is prima facie evidence that the CEMAC region is largely underdeveloped, with three of its 
members classified by UNCTAD as LDCs namely: Chad, the Central African Republic and 
                                                             
264 Fox EM, Competition Law 
265 UNCTAD, Competition Policy for Development: A Report on UNCTAD Capacity Building and Technical 
Assistance Programme in Competition Law and Policy, New York and Geneva 2004. 
266 Marcos. F, (2005) Do developing countries need Competition Law and Policy? Instituto de Empresa Business 
School. 
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Equatorial Guinea,
267
 whereas, Cameroon, Gabon and the Republic of Congo are classified as 
DCs.
268
 Cognisance needs to be taken of the above so as to lessen the assertion that a 
competition policy between the EU and the CEMAC region will generate a concomitant benefit 
for regional integration at an early stage.  
The CEMAC region is still very inexperienced in the process of establishing and implementing 
competition law and policies.  Indeed, according to the World Bank Competition Law Databases, 
Cameroon is the only country in the sub-region with a competition law,
269
 implying that the 
practice of competition or the regulation of national business is very underdeveloped or absent. 
Countries of the CEMAC region are still being initiated into the culture of competitive business 
practices.
270
 
 
4.1.2 Defining competition law 
 
There is no standard definition of Competition law. While some countries have made an attempt 
to give a statutory definition to competition law, others such the EU have left the concept 
undefined in their legislation.
271
 However, a generic definition of competition law will mean 
“Legislation enacted by […] governments to regulate trade and commerce by preventing 
unlawful restraints, price-fixing, and monopolies; to promote competition; and to encourage the 
production of quality goods and services at the lowest prices, with the primary goal of 
safeguarding public welfare by ensuring that consumer demands will be met by the manufacture 
and sale of goods at reasonable prices.”272 
                                                             
267UNCTAD, (2008). Least Developed Countries Report. 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ldc2008fas_en.pdf[Accessed on 10 November 2010]   
268 Source: World Bank, July (2008). 2009 List of Developing Countries. 
269World Bank Competition Law Databases 
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270 Dietmar B (2004) Competition Law and Perspectives for Harmonisation. Heinonline 9 Unif L. Ref. n.s. 501. 
271 UNCTAD  Model Law on Competition (2010) – Chapter II. Sixth United Nations Conference to Review All 
Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices. 
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4.1.3 Purpose of competition law 
 
Competition laws are introduced to regulate business transactions and other trade practices that 
may not be consistent with regular standards both within a particular nation or region and 
internationally.
273
 The main objective of competition law is to fight against the abuse of market 
power, abuse of dominance, and other trade distortion practices-cartels, price fixing, collusion 
etc. From a multilateral or regional perspective, competition law considers the promotion of 
regional integration, consumer protection, development of democratic norms, and creating 
opportunities for small businesses to thrive.
274
  
Though different countries may apply competition policy for different purposes, in the CEMAC 
region, it is one of the instruments adopted by the member states, with the objective of 
facilitating regional integration. The general objective however, is that of regulating and 
prohibiting certain types of mergers, and acquisitions, which may lead to serious monopolies and 
an eventual negative impact on consumers.
275
 
A case of interest is Cameroon, whose competition law was enacted by Law No. 98/013 of 14 
July, 1998, in response to global economic pressures. It sets out the legal framework for 
competition within Cameroon. In 2004, a Presidential Decree was signed establishing a 
commission for regulating competition, known as the Competition Regulatory Council (CRC), 
which is yet to be activated.
276
 “Competition law and competition policy have been virtually 
forced on [CEMAC] countries, fairly brusquely and with no alternative, by today‟s global 
economic realities.”277 This was stated in the last OECD Global Forum on Competition Law in 
2004.
278
   
 
The Cameroon competition law prohibits anti-competitive practice in its Articles 4-6. These 
include price fixing, bid rigging, collusion, and preventing the entry into or expulsion from the 
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market. Furthermore, Articles 15-20 deal with regulations on mergers, acquisitions and the abuse 
of dominance. Despite the fact that the law contains some salient issues of competition law, it 
failed to distinguish between horizontal and vertical agreements.
279
 This is an indication that the 
law is porous, and that there will be opportunities for violations.  
 As noted earlier in this chapter, states may apply competition legislation for different reasons. 
One of such reason has been found to be the following: “Governments are, in theory, the keepers 
of public interest, and may some times decide that competition is not in the public interest. 
Where a government replaces competition within its borders with public or private regulation, it 
does so presumably because the political community as a whole gains more than it loses.”280  
It can only be assumed at this juncture that the lack of commitment from the part of the CEMAC 
governments by failing to stop trade restriction measures may be aimed at such gains from 
political interest groups. Trade restriction is a common practice in the region which is blamed for 
its poor intraregional trade.
281
 Competition law is therefore, a check on both government and the 
private sector trade behaviours. Where governments are reluctant to enact laws or enforce 
existing once, restrictive practices may not be absent. 
 
Furthermore, competition law may not be in the best interest of the public and in such a case 
government will not implement the rules. This view is supported by Article 6 & 7 of the 1998 
Act.
282
 Thus where the government has regulations and a violation of such regulation is in the 
best interest of the public, the public interest will take precedence.  
 
In addition, according to Gerber‟s analysis of the European competition law, the generic aim of 
competition law is to ensure low price and increase quality for consumers. However, this 
commonly projected aim of competition law was not adhered to at its inception in Europe. He 
argues that, competition law has been used as an instrument for European Unification rather its 
generic objectives. 
283
 „… [The] focus in constructing the competition law system during the 
                                                             
279 Op cit 
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281281 See chapter 3 on trade practices in CEMAC. 
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1960s was not on protecting competition for the sake of its generic benefits, but creating a 
unified market‟. Article 85 (3) of the Treaty of Rome corroborated the above assertion.284 It 
prohibited restrain on competition within European borders and at the same time it failed to 
prohibit internal restrains, imply that where such restraint to competition within the internal 
market was beneficial to economic growth, there was no reason to prohibit its operation. Thus, 
one could conclude that the primary objective of the Law was not to achieve its generic meaning, 
but to archive regional integration in Europe.  
 
More research is therefore needed to examine this trade practice as viewed by each of the 
CEMAC member states, in order to comprehend some of the challenges and difficulties that 
these countries are currently facing, with regards to implementing an effective competition 
policy for the protection and enforcement of competition and competition policy in the region. 
 
4.1.4 The necessity for Competition Law in the CEMAC region 
 
According to Hoekman‟s evaluation, developing countries will benefit from either regional or 
multilateral agreement that: 
• Bans price fixing and market sharing; 
• Includes a ban on export cartels; and 
• Initiates a process of replacing anti-dumping actions with enforcement of domestic competition 
laws.
285
  
 
The debate as to whether developing countries need competition law has been widely discussed 
by scholars and policymakers in recent time.
286
 Through UNCTAD, and the WTO, discussions 
centred on the necessity of competition law for DCs have frequently been raised.
287
 Faced with 
the current trend in globalisation, where competition law and policy is taking a multilateral 
dimension, it becomes imperative for developing countries to embark on legislations to facilitate 
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the process. It is against this background that UNCTAD has taken the initiative to organise the 
education and training of experts from developing countries through conferences and training 
sessions to build capacity. „[A] strong competition policy is not just a luxury to be enjoyed by 
rich countries, but a real necessity for those striving to create democratic market economies.‟288 
 
The preamble of the constitutive act of CEMAC
289
clearly identifies the need for regional 
integration which goes beyond the confines of political and social ideologies into economic 
integration, to foster the development of a regional market through the establishment of rules that 
are pro economic growth and development, with the objective of alleviating poverty, promoting 
human rights, and the free movement of goods, persons and services within the sub-region. 
Members of the CEMAC region are being encouraged to enact laws that will facilitate the 
realisation of these objectives of the organisation.  That is, if the region wishes to experience the 
necessary economic integration that they envisage. Such laws, which include competition law 
and policy, must ensure the effective transparent implementation and regulation of business 
practices of both the public and private sectors of member states. 
 
Hence, competition law and policy will enable and support the entry into the regional market of 
both small and medium size firms to compete on the same bases with large firms without any 
room for discrimination.
290
 The effect is that not only do large firms benefit from such regulatory 
rules, but small firms as well, are given the opportunity to expand regionally and eventually 
internationally into the world market. Thus, different member states are obliged to their 
respective firms or companies whether public or private, to ensure their security in terms of 
monitoring the abuse of liberalisation that may be taken advantage of, by large firms to organise 
cartels. 
 
In addition, competition law would regulate the entry into the regional market. The liberalisation 
of the CEMAC regional market needs to be done with caution in order that foreign firms do not 
                                                             
288Striglitz (2000), as cited in Marcos. F, (2005) Do developing countries need Competition Law and Policy? 
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dominate and cause harm to home industries.
291
This would mean that those countries, like 
Cameroon, with a more liberal economic policy (aimed at attracting Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI)); need to review their policy with regards to competition law. According to Cameroon‟s 
investment charter, adopted in 1999,
292
 investors are allowed to enter the Cameroon market 
without prior government approval.
293
 The liberalisation of the CEMAC market, especially with 
the erosion of non-reciprocal trade preference would likely cause more harm to the regional 
market if firm applicable regulatory rules are not established.   
Though it is argued that liberalisation does not necessarily mean complete liberalisation, 
competition law thus works as a control mechanism to ensure the free flow of businesses while 
at the same time restricting businesses that seek to harm the blessings of liberalisation. Even 
developed countries with very large economies do not leave the door wide open for any 
competitor to enter their market, the same fear expressed by CEMAC members during the EPA 
negotiations.
294
 There is therefore need for CEMAC members especially those that are directly 
affected by the EPA, to institute a framework for regulating the entry of large firms into the 
regional market and their business practices.
295
 Marcos F, conceded to the above assertion by 
arguing that, the anticompetitive business practices by international cartels and multinationals 
have a detrimental effect on developing countries, and the presence of these international cartels 
are known to exist in developing countries as well.
296
 „Competition law may replace the current 
restrictive investment laws and regulations, incorporating principles based on non-discrimination 
in the control of restrictive business practices among firms regardless of their origin or 
nationality.‟297 
However, competition policy can only be useful to any region where a market exists.
298
 Having 
regards to the fact that the current market situation in CEMAC is code named „restriction‟, that 
is, due to the lack of intraregional trade in CEMAC, competition law and policy may not take 
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root unless trade between the members is completely free, and  a well established legal 
framework put in place.
299
 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITION IN CEMAC 
 
4.2.1 Legal framework under the Cotonou Agreement 
 
The current policy on competition was only enacted as members states feared the risk of opening 
up markets to other regional partners who are advancing in development. The CA signed in 2000 
incorporated in its chapter 5, on Trade Related Areas, a provision for competition policy between 
the ACP and the EU. As per the Agreement, the member states agreed in principle to introduce 
and gradually implement an effective and efficient competition policy to enhance trade and 
development within the ACP. Article 45 of CA lay down the framework negotiating competition 
policy with the EU. According Article 45 (3):  
 
The Parties […] agree to reinforce cooperation in this area 
[competition policy] with a view to formulating and supporting 
effective competition policies with the appropriate national 
competition agencies that progressively ensure the efficient 
enforcement of the competition rules by both private and state 
enterprises. Cooperation in this area shall, in particular, include 
assistance in the drafting of an appropriate legal framework and its 
administrative enforcement with particular reference to the special 
situation of the least developed countries.
300
  
 
It is trite to note that within the ambit of the CEMAC region, the concept of “competition” in the 
legal sense, still lies at the periphery of trade practices operational in the sub-region.
301
 While 
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negotiations of EPAs are still in process, 
302
scholars, politicians, and civil society are questioning 
the authenticity of the new agreement on CEMAC with regards to the condition of incorporating 
competition law in the CEMAC EPA.  
On a general note, DCs, including ACP states have often resisted and vetoed against the EU 
proposal for a multilateral framework for competition policy within the WTO. Since the EU‟s 
strategy through the WTO seemed to have met a deadlock, the EU is now pressing for 
competition policy as one of the condition for negotiating EPA. While the Caribbean Forum 
(CARIFORUM), CEMAC and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
are currently negotiating competition policy in their EPAs, regions such as ECOWAS and SADC 
have completely rejected the EU proposal. 
303
 
The framework for competition policy under the CA, made it optional for CEMAC countries to 
establish competition policy. This means that the agreement did not make it mandatory for 
members to negotiate competition policy. Article 45(2) added that where such competition 
policy is considered, it should be done “with due consideration to the different levels of 
development and economic needs of each ACP country…”304 
 
Thirdly, in the wordings of Article 45(3) of the CA, the EU is required to cooperate with 
CEMAC states, “to formulating and [support] effective competition policies with the appropriate 
national competition agencies that progressively ensure the efficient enforcement of the 
competition rules by both private and state enterprises [ within CEMAC].” Contrary to the above 
provision, the EU is proposing and EU-like competition policy which according Paolo V, 
undermines the development needs of these countries. “Within EPAs, the EU is proposing 
competition policy provisions that would: 
1. Identify and prevent anti-competitive behaviour to the extent that it affects trade between the 
EU and CEMAC, 
2. Provide rules on restrictive agreements and concerted practices between undertakings, abuse 
of dominant position, mergers and state aid and, 
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3. Address the appropriate legal framework and bodies in charge of implementation of 
competition rules to guarantee a transparent and an effective enforcement of their respective 
competition rules”305 
Thus, under the current framework, the CEMAC states have a choice either to suspend 
competition policy with the EU and strengthen regional competition policy to facilitate growth 
within the CEMAC region before opening up to a more experience EU producers.  
 
4.2.2 Framework under CEMAC 
 
In 2008, the CEMAC Council of Ministers requested the revision of the CEMAC Competition 
Law of 1999 and 2005. The project was facilitated by experts from member states, the CEMAC 
Commission, and the Court of Justice. The aim was to revise particularly Law No. 1/99-
UDEAC-CM-639 of 25 June 1999, regulating anticompetitive practice in CEMAC. This law was 
established to regulate anticompetitive business practices within the CEMAC region and to 
prevent undue competition from non members.
306
Since CEMAC competition policy cut across 
national boundaries, they do not discriminate against other firms that are in the region. These 
principles go a long way to facilitate regional integration, economic liberalisation; thus fulfilling 
the objectives of CEMAC. One must acknowledge that CEMAC is one of few African regional 
economic groups that have made substantial efforts at regional integration, albeit more is yet to 
be done. Below is an analysis of certain legal structure within the CEMAC sub-region, aimed at 
contextualising the current legal framework for businesses in CEMAC, and to ascertain its 
contribution to regional integration. One of such moves has been the harmonisation of its 
business laws, under OHADA. 
 
4.2.2.1 OHADA Laws and the CEMAC Integration Process 
 
The Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (known by its French 
acronym (Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA)) was 
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established on 17 October 1993, in Port Louis, Mauritius, by 16 African countries.
307
 It is made 
up countries of CEMAC, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WEMU), the 
Comoros Islands and Guinea. OHADA was constituted with the objective of instituting a single 
legal framework, enforceable by each member state, to remedy the legal uncertainties and 
insecurities affecting economic activities between the various states. It laid down rules governing 
national, regional and international businesses in terms of creation and registration.  
The main objective of OHADA was to deal with the problem of judicial insecurity that had 
affected the region‟s legal systems. As former French colonies, the members had depended on 
colonial rules for decades to enhance trade. There was, therefore, need for a change as 
globalisation and innovation had provoked the necessity for a new legal framework to oversee 
the security of state businesses, and investor security through a fair judicial system.
308
 „The 
judicial uncertainty arose from the breakdown of how justice is administered, in both law and 
professional ethics, including a lack of material resources, insufficient training of judges and 
court officers.‟309   
 
4.2.2.2 OHADA and domestic laws 
 
As has been seen above, OHADA harmonises the business laws of the French West Africa and 
Central African regions. The harmonisation process has brought together the national legislation 
of member states into a unified system. This, technically speaking, means that domestic laws 
relating to business have now been replaced by OHADA laws.  Member states have had to make 
provision for the implementation and enforcement of the Uniform Laws. Such a unified legal 
mechanism is, on the face of it, good, and is hailed as a milestone achievement for the West and 
Central African states. 
However, Dickerson proposed that the revision of domestic institutions rather than regional 
institutions to attract investors could be more beneficial to the economy of CEMAC, if such 
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institutions are structured to encourage domestic economic development.
310
 Once such domestic 
social institutions have been put in place at local levels and tested, then, political and social 
institutions can engage in attracting foreign investors in a competitive market situation. Domestic 
industries would experience competition from stronger economies thus creating a forum for 
growth and expansion.
311
 Dickerson argued that OHADA is poised not to yield the expected 
result of developing the economies of the CEMAC states. Such assertion was based on the fact 
that OHADA was derived from the French civil law system which has been criticised for not 
being pro-development for developing countries, a fact with which the OHADA advocates and 
experts agreed.
312
  
 
4.2.2.3 The structure of OHADA  
 
OHADA is structured to give the executive a strong influence on the market which has had a 
negative impact to the economies of CEMAC and WAEU. At the head of its structure is the 
Conference of Head of States, Council of Ministers, the Common Court of Arbitration, and the 
Permanent Secretariat.
313
 While the OHADA head quarter is based in Yaoundé, the Court of 
Arbitration is located in Abidjan. This structure is similar to the French legal system known to be 
against free market economy. Dickerson argues that such anti-free market economic behaviour 
was a replica of the French civil law system and has had greater negative effect for developing 
countries than what Common Law system had for common law countries. A comparison of the 
Common Law and Civil Law systems showed that the former does not protect the state from the 
judiciary but protects private property from the influence of the state. On the contrary, the later 
protects the state from the judiciary. The truth of this assertion was mentioned earlier as one of 
the characteristic of CEMAC countries with their strong adherence to state sovereignty.
314
 
Besides, all of these states have presidents that have been in power for at least a decade. Below is 
a diagrammatic representation of the OHADA structure. 
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 Figure 1 Structure of OHADA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
It is submitted that OHADA does not provide a complete legal mechanism for the development 
of CEMAC countries, especially in the light of the current trend to globalisation, calling for the 
opening up of markets through the elimination of substantially all barriers to trade.  Its 
competition provisions are by far too limited. Thus, the promotion and protection of competition 
is not a priority aspect of the law. OHADA, despite the fact that it ensures judicial security to the 
CEMAC region, does not seem to protect consumers‟ interest. The national supreme courts of 
member states are oblige to forward any case to the Court of Arbitration (Court Commune d’ 
Arbitration (CCJA)) for final arbitration. These national supreme courts are inclined to be 
protective of their authority and jurisdiction.
315
  
 
OHADA deals with mergers and demergers of companies.
316
 It does not form a competition 
policy for the CEMAC region: first because it is not exclusively related to CEMAC; secondly, 
while is a good law regulating the procedure for companies to be registered, it is limited in that it 
does not provide an elaborate competition policy, that is, a system that regulates business 
practices and the abuse of dominance, cartels, etc.  
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The application of OHADA is limited as various national courts are now threatened in that the 
referral of cases to CCJA may interfere with national legal security and authority of appellate 
and supreme courts. Litigants are also faced with the issue of cost. This again makes OHADA 
difficult to apply by the supranational court based in Abidjan. When the cost of associating with 
a particular legal regime becomes too high, prospective litigants may be forced to look for an 
alternative that is a convenient and less costly legal system. OHADA thus involves costs for both 
plaintiffs and respondents.
317
  
 
The convergence of laws, or rather harmonisation of laws becomes easier if members involved 
have experienced some level of national autonomy and regulation, that is, some level of 
competition, regulated by law. This goes a long way to build capacity for the member states 
involved, a situation which is far from being true in the CEMAC region. Such harmonisation 
would lead to true convergence of laws.
318
 “Harmonisation would be achieved by encouraging 
countries to ensure that they have in place „an adequate set of competition rules and that are 
effectively enforced‟”319  
 
Taking a vivid look at the examples of Europe and the USA, harmonisation of business laws or 
competition laws could only have been possible because of the economic relationship and 
interactions between the European states or the US economic relationship with Mexico.
320
 Such 
economic interaction, created an atmosphere for competition that resulted in the harmonisation 
of their competition laws. The situation in CEMAC reflects a lack of experience in the relevant 
fields and is likely to face challenges with regards to enforcement.
321
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4.3.1 Enforcement of competition law in CEMAC 
 
Without a strong legal framework for enforcing competition law, enforcement can become the 
most herculean task for most developing countries. The task of enforcing laws whether at 
national, regional or international levels can be the most cumbersome task to accomplish. This is 
one most important aspect of lawmaking. While it is proposed that an international approach 
should be adopted as a means to enforcing competition law through a common multilateral 
framework,
322
 some schools of thoughts are of the opinion that enforcement from a regional or 
bilateral perspective could yield better results.
323
 The rationale for some of these differences in 
approach enforcing competition law is based on the assertion that with the advent of 
globalization, interdependence between states has become common practice, regardless of 
whether such dependence was (is) political or economically motivated.
324
  
The level of dependence of states within a certain geographical area cannot be ignored when 
looking at the enforcement of competition law from an international or regional perspective.
325
 
Thus, putting the CEMAC situation in context, such dependence is either absent or too limited in 
terms of trade within the region.
326
 With a proliferation of patches of legal provisions within the 
CEMAC region,
327
 the consequence of overlapping regional organisations,
328
 that is, at national 
and regional levels, including a multilateral framework, with its already too much legislation 
related to competition law, may overburden the already weak and inefficient legal structures.  
„The limitations on the judicial chamber‟s enforcement powers are 
mainly due to the fact that no cases are referred to it, which prevents 
the chamber from “emerging” as an inevitable control organ in the 
community institutional machinery at this stage. Furthermore, the 
absence of a genuine procedure in respect of failure to fulfil an 
obligation, which is backed by penalties for non-compliance, 
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prevents the chamber from meting out punishment where community 
or national acts fail to comply with community conventions and 
treaties.‟ 329 
The above quotation shows that the same may repeat itself in other CEMAC regulatory agencies.  
An example is taken of Cameroon where its 1998 Competition Law, created a National 
Competition Commission, an “independent” body to carry out the enforcement of competition 
policy. Since its establishment in 1998, the institution is yet to be operational. Such a delay in 
implementation of laws is not new, as laws generally in that country and within the CEMAC 
region delayed in terms of application.
330
 When countries of the same region establish common 
rules and regulations to harness an integration process, it is likely that they will constitute an 
independent institution, separate from the state parties yet empowered to perform various 
functions with regards to implementing such laws and regulations hitch-free. Such independent 
legal framework demands the diminishing of national sovereignty in favour of a regional 
institution framework for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency.
331
   
Nevertheless, CEMAC community laws are agreed, in principle, to be superior to national 
laws.
332
 The gradual enforcement of these community laws is bringing about a decline of the 
power of the states vis-à-vis community laws.
333
 However, despite this gradual process of loss of 
sovereignty to community laws and other regulatory frameworks, CEMAC is yet to achieve its 
objectives due to the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism which is independent and 
empowered to ensure the effective implementation of community laws.  
„There are concerns about the capacity to implement the community 
competition law. Despite political will at the regional level, 
institutional weaknesses in member States affect implementation 
capacity. Cameroon is the only Member State with national 
competition law and authority. There is still much to be done at the 
national level to address resource constraints for effective application 
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of community laws. There is clear allocation of responsibilities 
between community competition authorities and [National 
Competition Authorities]. However, until the system is put into 
practice, it is difficult to comment on its effectiveness in dealing with 
anticompetitive practices.‟334  
According to Roscar du Toit, though trade across borders has become a common practice, a 
situation known to be absent or rather limited in CEMAC, enforcement of domestic competition 
laws would pose no problem to the international market. Thus, Du Toit states that enforcement 
of competition law from a regional or international perspective will have far-reaching effect on 
the economy of state parties especially developing countries.
335
  
Furthermore, though it is argued that globalization has created system of dependence from state 
to state, such dependence is very limited within the CEMAC regional market.
336
 Dependence 
seems to stem from out side CEMAC rather than from the Sub-region.
337
 In such a situation, one 
could see the lapses that already exist in the enforcement of competition law within the CEMAC 
region. Inasmuch as there is need to regulate business practices within and between states, such 
regulatory frameworks are usually born from a long history of trade interactions between the 
members that necessitates regulations.  
“Intra-regional trade is [ ] hampered by problems of implementation such as national trade 
practices which are not always consistent with Community regulations.  The Executive 
Secretariat of the CEMAC also cites "misapplication of tax and customs codes and regulations, 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade, poor compliance with Community rules of 
origin and provisions on the regulation of competition".
338
  Non-tariff barriers include, in 
particular, burdensome rules and procedures; the non-viability of certain transport corridors; or 
                                                             
334 UNCITAD (2008) Geneva Conference on United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 15–18 July 
2008, Geneva 
335 Du Toit R,  (1999) Op cit 
336 Tsangarides, C. G. & Martijn, J. K. (2007), p.4-19. Intraregional trade is less than 3.3 per cent. 
337 Ibid 
338 Executive Secretariat of the CEMAC (2005) 
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the inadequacies of transport services.
339
  One obstacle to the movement of goods is the absence 
of a single entry point system, which results in the double taxation of certain products.”340  
 
4.3.2 CEMAC Competition Regulatory Framework 
 
The legal framework for regulating competition within the CEMAC region is embedded in its 
Regulation No. 1/99/UEAC-CM-639 of June 25, 1999. The structure of CEMAC, its political 
and economic institutions gives a strong signal that integration through competition may not 
yield the expected result as the system hasn‟t change for decades and for various reasons one 
could only but speculate another era of a stagnating economic policy, under development and 
growth. Certain fundamental structures are needed to be in place to act as a bed rock for any 
competition policy to be effective. Some of these include governments‟ commitment to enforce 
the rule of law in a free market economy.
341
  
 Its structures consist of a Council of Heads of State which is the supreme organ of the region, 
the Council of Ministers, Ministerial Committee, Executive Secretariat, Inter State Committee, 
Bank of Central African State (BEAC), Banking Commission of Central African States 
(COBAC) and lastly the Institution for Financing Development. These organs were created to 
govern the affairs of CEMAC through its institutions.
342
 In 2000, the CEMAC member states 
established the CEMAC Court of Justice and the Inter-Parliamentary Commission, an 
institutional strategy to implementing the Article 2 of the CEMAC constitutive Act. The 
establishment of these institutions as an enforcement mechanism within sub-region was hailed to 
be a plus to its regional integration efforts. Despite the establishment of the Inter-Parliamentary 
committee to facilitate the establishment of the Regional Parliament, it only took effect in April 
2010.  The Executive Secretariat is charged with the enforcement of competition regulations in 
                                                             
339 International Monetary Fund (2006) 
340 Trade and Investment Regime-Cameroon  WT/TPR/S/187. Trade Policy Review Page 83 
341  Wakemen-Linn J, Wagh S, (2008). Regional Financial Integration: Its Potential Contribution to Financial Sector 
Growth and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. International Monetary Fund 
342 Article 2 of 1994 CEMAC Treaty 
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CEMAC as defined by the CEMAC treaty.
343
 Its prerogatives are limited to making 
recommendations to the Council of Ministers.  
 From what transpires in other regional groups or even with the EU, there is a competition 
commission independent of state control but empowered to enforce competition laws. The reason 
possibly for an independent regulatory body may be akin to the need to ensure efficiency and 
effective business practice that benefits the community. 
 
4.3.3 Regulating Competition in CEMAC: National and Regional Interest. 
 
“CEMAC countries are members of OHADA, Inter African Conference for the Insurance Market 
(CIMA) … and the African Intellectual Property Organisation. These regulatory frameworks 
were adopted to provide legal safeguards and create an enabling environment for private sector 
development to complement the actions of CEMAC.”344 Cameroon has ratified the CEMAC 
regulation on competition law and has implemented certain provisions but with reservations on 
other issues.
345
 This is an indication that regulating competition would eventually face 
challenges.  
However, in order to curb some of the immediate challenges to regulating competition law in 
CEMAC, Article 6 and 7 of the CEMAC competition law states that three CEMAC institutions 
are responsible regulating and enforcing competition law in the regional market. These are, the 
CEMAC Commission and the Court of Justice and the CEMAC Competition Council. The 
Commission has jurisdiction to decide on all matters relating to competition. It can also adopt the 
decision of the CEMAC Council relating to offences of anticompetitive behaviours, common 
rules of competition and can stop the abuse dominance. It also ensures the prevention of states‟ 
subsidies.
346
 In addition, the Article 8 created the Community Competition Council (CCC) with 
                                                             
343 See Articles 23 and 24 of CAMEC Constitutive Act, 1991 
344 CIMA Treaty (Inter-African Conference on Insurance Markets),  CIPRES Treaty (Inter-African Conference on 
Social Welfare), ARSO Treaty (African Regional Organisation for Standardisation), the AFRISTAT Treaty 
(Economic and Statistical Observatory of Sub-Saharan Africa), <http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=2495> 
[Accessed on 21 September 2010] 
345Moneyang  N. S, (2008)  Les Concentration D‟entreprises en droit Interne et en Droit Communautaire CEMAC. 
Afrilex  
346 Article 7 CEMAC Competition law 2010 Available at 
http://patronat-ecam.org/Documents/Projet_de_revision_Dispositif_institutionnel_concurrence_Cemac.pdf  
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the status of a legal personality. The CCC is open to all members of the public so as to clarify the 
general public on issues relating to competition in CEMAC. From the above provision, it is clear 
that the CCC can sue and be sued.  
According to Article 72 of the above law, the CEMAC Court of Justice is the final decision 
making body of any matter relating to anticompetitive behaviour. In this regard, Article 9 
provides that national courts dealing with competition issues before them can request for such 
clarity either from the CCC or the Court of Justice. Thus the region recognizes the need for 
competitiveness in its economy by the creation of common market bound by a single community 
rules.
347
  Despite the efforts at establishing regional competition law and regional competition 
council, these structures are not fully independent.  Therefore, the extent of the effectiveness of 
the regional competition law will depend on the level of sovereignty granted to the institutions 
that have been created to ensure that there is free and fair competition within the region. It is 
against this backdrop that the hypothesis of this research can be said to hold true for the region.  
Furthermore, it will also depend on the amount of autonomy that such a competition commission 
could exert within the sub-region both on private and public companies.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The above analysis has shown that there is a wide gap between developed and developing 
countries generally and the EU and CEMAC in particular with regards to the concept of 
competition law. Having seen that the EU is more advanced in this legal practice, the CEMAC 
countries are barely less than a decade into this new phenomenon.  Cameroon being the only 
state in the region with a competition law is corroborative to the assertion that region is not yet 
legally prepared to establish competition law with the EU as is being proposed in EPA.  
The analysis has also shown that one of CEMAC‟s key legal instruments for regional and 
international trade is the OHADA Laws. Yet the OHADA is fraud with various limitations to 
qualify as providing sufficient competition rules and regulations. Indeed, the OHADA is aimed 
at ensuring judicial security between two French regions in Africa- CEMAC and French West 
Africa.  
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The CEMAC region lacks the enforcement mechanism to deter violators of regional laws or 
punish them.
348
 The absence of a supra regional structure for decision making in CEMAC 
inhibits the integration process.
349
 This will likely affect the enforcement of its competition 
policy. In addition, despite the establishment of the various regulatory organs in the region, with 
the Court of Justice as custodian of the rule of law in the region, this institution is still too young 
and lacks the experience to embark dealing with highly experience multinational companies 
from the EU, with their well established legal experience. Thus, looking at the legal capacity of 
the region, it share honesty to state that the CEMAC regional is not yet ready for a competition 
law with the EU and that such law should first be well developed within the region and 
strengthened before it can be made available to non-regional members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION 
                                                             
348 Krever R, (2008) P.219. VAT in Africa: editor, Richard Krever  
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5.1 Introduction 
There is no doubt that the CEMAC region has made substantial efforts at regional integration. 
This can be seen from the institutionalization of the relevant structures to ensure greater 
integration. The CEMAC region has been able to put in place a common monetary union, with a 
single currency issued by a BEAC, a common market and a common external tariff system. The 
CEMAC Court of Justice and the Regional Parliament are fully operational. The CEMAC has 
launched a CEMAC passport to facilitate the free movement of people within the region. 
Besides, there are several other projects in process to facilitate integration. However, amongst 
the many strategies for integration adopted, the region, as mentioned earlier in the above 
chapters, is still being classified as the least integrated region in Africa. The arguments put 
forward in this research has shown that despite all that has been done to achieve the objective of 
regional integration, such as establishing institutions, there is a fundamental problem affecting 
the full integration of the region. According to the above arguments, incorporating a competition 
policy in the current EPA negotiations, may only result in deeper economic crises, 
unemployment, stagnating regional economy and increase regional strive for national interest.  
In determining the above, the study dwelled on the analysis of certain trade instruments from a 
multilateral perspective to bilateral agreements, culminating to the regional trade instruments 
used to facilitate trade within the region.  
First, the Enabling Clause restricts developed countries from negotiating trade with DCs on the 
bases of reciprocity. The Enabling Clause ruled out the possibility of such trade arrangements. It 
added that, “The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them 
in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of developing 
countries, i.e., the developed countries do not expect the developing countries, in the course of 
trade negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual  
development, financial and trade needs.”350 Based on this provision, the negotiation of 
competition law between the EU and the CEMAC region under the EPA arrangement ought to 
be done, with regards to the economic difficulties patterning to the CEMAC countries. 
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Moreover, the EU trade preference to CEMAC is conditioned on several political and social 
obligations. Those conditions are inconsistent with WTO rules. The conditioning of trade on 
political and social obligations, despite whatever justifications are given to it, is another form of 
reciprocity to ensure EU‟s security in trade. This does not make EPA politically friendly.   
The region is made up of three DCs and LDCs with Sao Tome & Principe standing always as an 
observer, though participating in almost all sessions of the regional meetings. The implication of 
this state of the region placed them on a most vulnerable position in the current EPA negotiation. 
Since these countries are offered different option under the EPA (EBA for LDCs and GSP+ for 
DCs) trade arrangements, the first issue is that EPA may result in increased disintegration of the 
region as the main focus may now be on the benefits offered by the EU under EPA. This was 
evident in 2007 when Cameroon decided to initial an interim EPA aside from its regional 
members. Secondly, it led to a return to national interest taking precedence over regional 
integration. CEMAC may soon find itself in the situation of the East African Community (EAC) 
and SADC where a splitting of the two regional groups is already taking place.
351
 
In addition, the EU is proposing an amalgamation of CEMAC and ECCAS. Having regard to the 
history of the two organisations, this may never be possible. CEMAC, though instrumental in the 
creation of ECCAS, is not ready to jeopardise efforts and achievements for over three decades. 
The proposal simply means that one organisation should be dissolved or submerged into another. 
Looking back at the multi-membership in the region, CEMAC states seem to exhibit some level 
of stability to the CEMAC, unlike CEGL members, who form part of ECCAS, SADC, 
COMESA, and the Nile Basin initiative. Meanwhile, five of CEMAC‟ members belong to 
CEMAC and ECCAS only. With regards to the MFN obligations, CEMAC members may not be 
ready to open up market to all of the above mentioned regional blocks in order to comply with 
the MFN obligation of non-discrimination. Moreover, there have been conflicting ideas as to the 
                                                             
351 ESA/COMESA has split with the emergence of the EAC EPA, which leaves the region with mainly least 
developed countries and island states – none of which are likely to champion regional integration; and SADC has 
lost most of its members during the EPA negotiating process, so that economic integration is now centred on SACU 
(plus Mozambique). The other SADC countries have either tied their external tariffs to a different framework 
(Tanzania in EAC and Madagascar, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe in ESA) or are hardly involved in regional economic 
integration. 
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harmonisation of the RoO for both CEMAC and ECCAS. While it is proposed that the CEMAC 
incorporate the ECCAS model, some CEMAC members are yet to agree on the proposal.  
The region has established a regional court which is yet to develop its own experience in case-
law and in statute. With its two chambers, the regional court has only been able to provide 
judgement to 17 disputes referred to it, eight years after it was created. This may be due to the 
fact that national courts do not refer cases to the regional court or that national courts are 
protecting their jurisdiction and sovereignty.  
As was mentioned earlier, regional integration did not emerge from within CEMAC but from the 
EU. This means that the notion of regional court is a borrowed concept, transported from the EU 
to CEMAC with its rules and obligations which sometimes may not meet the immediate judicial 
needs of the region.
352
 Allan F Tatham stated that the implication of the transfer of legal systems 
or rules is an indication that there is limited relationship between the law and the community 
where such laws are transferred.
353
 He added that the OHADA law does not provide a 
preliminary reference procedure from national courts with regards to making request for 
interpretation of regional laws or questioning their validity. This may probably explain why very 
few cases are referred to it by national courts.
354
 
The OHADA laws as examined above, does not provide an appropriate legal framework for 
competition in the CEMAC region. Besides, the OHADA system cuts across various West 
African communities which may likely increase the cost of operation within that jurisdiction. As 
earlier mentioned, the OHADA court of Arbitration is based in Abidjan which makes it difficult 
for local companies to access its facilities. In addition, national courts on their part tend to be 
protective of their jurisdiction and sovereignty. This could also be one the reasons why few cases 
are referred to it.  
The problem of overlapping membership and the proliferation of patches of legislation may in 
the long run result in confusion and lack of effectiveness. If faced with a situation where the 
members of OHADA choose to set up an elaborate competition law, and CEMAC incorporate 
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catholic University, Budapest. EUIA2010 Conference Programme Version 0.2:19 March 2010 
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such laws, it may lead to increase in anticompetitive practices as two companies may decide to 
take their case to two different courts. It may also lead to the issue of superiority of court in the 
region. In a case of violation, the CEMAC Court of Justice or the OHADA Court of Arbitration, 
which court would have priority of jurisdiction in a situation of anticompetitive practice 
involving subsidiaries of a multinational company operating with CEMAC and the West Africa 
region? This question needs to be addressed either by the OHADA laws or the CEMAC 
constitution with respect to competition law. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
 
Having regard to the fact that the CEMAC region is classified by UNECA as the least integrated 
region in Africa, a more pragmatic approach in its regional policy must be taken to ensure a 
realistic achievement to regional integration. In this regard, regional policies aimed at facilitating 
regional integration needs to be enforced with immediate effect. CEMAC members have to 
ensure that the objectives of regional integration stated in the CEMAC constitution, such as free 
movement of goods persons and services within the region be accelerated.  
Mindful of the fact that intra-CEMAC trade is lowest in Africa, compared to other regional 
blocs, the region must embark on greater regional liberalisation effort to combat this impediment 
to regional integration and competition. According to Maria-Angels Oliva, trade between 
CEMAC states is at 3% compared to trade within the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU)‟s 9.4%.355  
With respect to trade within CEMAC, its institutional structures-associated with issues of state 
sovereignty, coupled with the administrative burden of managing the already existing limited 
resources by belonging to several regional institutions that entails cost on the members, the 
effects on observer members in the region, are all hurdles that must be overcome through 
rigorous policy decisions in the region. Thus, the CEMAC members, rather than spreading risk, 
should concentrate their resources on building capacity within the region and its institutions for 
an effective and more realistic regional interaction and development. 
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 The above having been said, from the arguments of Eleanor M Fox in chapter four of this work, 
DCs with weak legal instruments and structures, often fall prey to multinational cartels from 
developed counties.
356
 This view is supported by Paolo V, who stated that some ACP producers 
are likely to become victims of EU corporations forming cartels or oligopolies. What this 
research proposes that since the CA does not oblige any ACP member to negotiate competition 
policy with the EU, the CEMAC region should consider the implication and rather suspend any 
form of competition policy until the regions‟ experience in dealing with competition and anti 
competition practices have developed to a reasonable standard in terms of law, enforcement of 
law and building-capacity in that respect.
357
 
As provided by the CA, competition policy between the EU and CEMAC should be based first, 
on provisions that support regional integration and strengthening the relevant structures already 
in place. Negotiations should take the form of building-capacity and granting technical assistance 
to CEMAC competition Commission. The primary focus of such a policy should be based on 
developing the regional institutions and monitoring its developments rather than setting up a 
competition policy with the EU. The duration for this to develop should be the same as the 
duration proposed by CEMAC members under the under current EPA negation, that is, 25 year 
period.
358
 
On the part of CEMAC members, a proactive approach at regional competition, law 
enforcement, should be carried out by policy makers so as to ensure regional security. CEMAC 
members should ensure greater liberalisation of the market, harmonise the procedures for 
enforcing regional laws (see appendix 2) in terms of the cost, documents, time spent in 
processing documents etc.  
Finally, the CEMAC Competition Commission should be made autonomous and independent of 
the Council of Heads of States of CEMAC. However, it should be answerable to the CEMAC 
Parliament and where there are issues of interpretation of regional laws, the CEMAC Court of 
Justice should have jurisdiction in such matters.   Where the roles of the various stakeholders are 
clearly defined, regional integration, becomes an object rather than a subject of policy.                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                             
356 Fox E.M (2000) supra 
357 Paolo V.B (2007) supra 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Doing Business in CEMAC, position in world ranking. 
World Bank data base 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Starting a 
Business 
 
Dealing 
with 
Constructi
on Permits 
 
Registering 
Property 
 
Getting 
Credit 
 
Protecting 
Investors 
 
Paying 
Taxes 
 
Trading 
Across 
Borders 
 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
 
Closing a 
Business  
 
Cameroon 168 131 118 149 138 120 169 155 173 141 
CAR 182 161 148 141 138 132 182 182 173 183 
Chad 183 183 101 137 152 154 197 171 164 183 
Congo 175 146 81 118 168 154 163 172 172 155 
Equatorial  
Guinea 
164 179 109 79 138 147 170 137 72 183 
Gabon 156 153 67 132 138 154 140 134 148 139 
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Appendix 2 
 
Enforcing legal actions for CEMAC countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
World Bank data base 2010 
 Number of 
procedures 
Average time(days) 
spent in resolving 
disputes 
The cost in (in %) 
of debt value in 
terms of court fees, 
average attorney fee 
& enforcement fee 
Cameroon 42 800 46.6 
CAR 43 660 82 
Chad 41 743 45.7 
Congo 44 560 53.2 
Equat. Guinea 40 553 18.5 
 
 
 
 
